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ABSTRACT 
Ordinary Warscapes in Sierra Leone: 
The Relationship between the Sierra Leone Civil War
and Its Cultural Landscape. (December 2006) 
Jeremiah Matthew Wagstaff, B.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Jonathan Smith
The recent civil war in Sierra Leone (1991-2002) saw massive migrations 
amongst the civilian population and widespread damage to villages and towns.  This 
study combines elements of military and cultural geography to ask the questions of how 
the events of the war changed the cultural landscape and how the cultural landscape 
influenced the course of the war.  Fieldwork for this study was conducted during the 
summer of 2005 in the Eastern Province and included numerous semi-structured 
interviews regarding the landscape histories of villages, towns, and various temporary 
camps.   
These findings revealed that a clear relationship existed between the civil war 
and the cultural landscape.  On the one hand, the war caused dramatic changes in the 
morphology of the cultural landscape, creating three distinct landscapes (pre-war, war-
time, and post-war), while on the other hand the cultural landscape went far to structure 
the character of the war.   
In order to understand how the cultural landscape structured the war one must 
first consider how the landscape was perceived by each major faction (Revolutionary 
United Front, Sierra Leone  Army, and Civil Defense Forces) as presenting a unique set 
of risks and opportunities.  This perception was based in their strategic intentions and 
capabilities.  Intentions can be understood as military objectives (derived from political 
goals), while capabilities can be understood as factors which constrain and enable action.  
Since each faction had different military objectives and capabilities they each perceived 
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the landscape in a unique manner and this perception influenced their military 
operations.   
It is recommended that cultural geographers begin to study the impacts of war on 
the landscape and that military geographers expand their focus on the physical landscape 
by taking into account the role of the cultural landscape and environmental perception. 
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When the rebels attacked they killed 3 people and burned 
many houses and buildings like the school, market, church, 
the chief’s house and those of other important people.  
They captured maybe 50 people who were forced to carry 
everything valuable to Zogoda (rebel base); most of them 
we never saw again.  We all ran to the bush and hid until it 
was safe.  Some of us stayed there for several weeks or 
even months.  Then, we went to Kenema and stayed in the 
camps.  When we returned a few years later, there was 
only rubble and foundations left. 
      --Excerpts of interview with villagers from Kpai  
 
The small West-African country of Sierra Leone recently emerged from a brutal 
civil war (1991-2002), in which a majority of the fighting targeted the civilian 
population, not opposing armed factions.  During the war, at least fifty-thousand people 
were killed, while thousands more suffered amputated limbs.  Around one million 
citizens became refugees in neighboring Guinea and Liberia and nearly the entire 
population became internally displaced at one time or another.1  These numbers were out 
of a pre-war population of roughly four million people.  These population disruptions 
were largely the result of deliberate attacks on the civilian population practiced to 
varying degrees by all of the major armed factions.
These strategies, as well as the demographic changes they precipitated, produced 
widespread and fundamental changes in the cultural landscape of Sierra Leone.  By 
cultural landscape, I am referring to everything from settlement patterns, house types, 
transportation networks, land use patterns, and urban morphology to less tangible 
                                                           
This thesis follows the style of African Affairs. 
1
 Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone (Hurst & 
Company, London, 2005), p. 7. 
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elements of iconography and perceived meaning.2  The variable character of this 
landscape played an important role in structuring the course of the war.  The major goal 
of this study is to document and describe changes in the cultural landscape caused by the 
war.  A secondary goal is to discern the role the landscape played in influencing the 
course of the war. 
The major contribution of this study lies in furthering our understanding of the 
impact of war on the cultural landscape, a topic only a handful of studies in geography 
have examined.  This knowledge can be useful to both policy makers and academics.  If 
we are to solve the problems caused by war and repair its effects, we must first know 
what those effects are.  Military geographers have rarely looked beyond physical factors 
and a major argument of this work is the equal, if not greater, relevance of the man-made 
landscape.  There is also a heated debate in the literature on the war in Sierra Leone over 
the causes and nature of the war.  This study has something to add to that debate, 
assuming changes in the cultural landscape reflect the character of the war at that time 
and place. 
Theoretical Framework 
This thesis seeks to answer two primary questions: 
1)  How was the cultural landscape of Sierra Leone changed during and after the war? 
2)  How did this cultural landscape influence the course of the war? 
The first question is one of cultural geography and the second question is one of 
military geography.  Both questions are unusual because cultural geographers have 
rarely studied the impact of war on the landscape and military geographers have rarely 
looked at the influence of the human landscape in shaping the outcome of wars.  To my 
                                                           
2
 My understanding of the term cultural landscape comes from Carl Ortwin Sauer, ‘The morphology of 
landscape’ in John Leighley (ed.), Land and Life (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967) and 
D.W. Meinig (ed.), The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes: Geographical Essay (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1979).  My use of term cultural landscape is heavily biased to morphology, although at 
times I discuss meaning. 
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knowledge, no study has combined both of these questions in a single work.  Although 
war is a topic rarely studied by cultural geographers, the ideas of one its most famous 
practitioners, Carl Sauer, form the basis of this study.  In two well-known works, he 
outlines an approach for understanding the cultural landscape rooted in the concepts of 
morphology and perception.3
For Sauer, the landscape can be understood as being made up of a variety of 
forms, which combine to create structures.  This framework for understanding the 
landscape is referred to by Sauer as the “morphologic method.”  In this work, I will 
examine the cultural landscape of Sierra Leone using this methodology, by 
understanding it as a variety of forms, which combine to produce four major structures, 
referred to as morphological units.  These four morphological units are the village, town, 
rebel forest base, and transportation network.  Each of these morphological units, or 
structures, can be broken down into their constituent forms, so that the structure of a 
village is made up of a variety of forms, such as house, farm, sohkwehun, court barri, 
church, etc. 
The other concept that I borrow from Sauer is the notion that all landscapes are 
perceived as having a unique set of risks and opportunities by their inhabitants.  These 
perceptions are unique because every culture sees the landscape in a different manner.  I 
use this idea to understand how the four morphological units in question influenced the 
course of the conflict.  While the three main factions involved in the war do not 
represent different cultures, they were certainly very different military institutions, each 
with unique habits of thought. 
A handful of studies in geography have explored the impacts of war on the 
cultural landscape.  Toal and Dahlman have investigated the effects of the war in Bosnia 
on resettlement in two counties.  Their study emphasizes the politics and circumstances 
behind the creation of a post-war landscape, while describing war-time changes mainly 
                                                           
3
 Carl Ortwin Sauer, ‘The morphology of landscape’ and ‘Foreword to historical geography’ in John 
Leighley (ed.), Land and Life (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967). 
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to set the context.4  Steinberg and Taylor have written an interesting study of monuments 
and memorials in post-war Guatemala, but again their focus was on the post-war 
condition and they are concerned with iconography rather than morphology.5  Falah has 
examined Israel’s intentional destruction of Palestinian villages during and after the 
1948 war.6  His work is very comprehensive and empirical, although the subject matter 
is slightly different than my own. 
Falah’s work gave me the idea that individual villages could be studied, although 
we have gone about the research in completely different manners.  He relies heavily on 
historical documents, whereas I rely mainly on semi-structured interviews with villagers.  
Steinberg and Taylor’s study gave me the idea to include monuments and memorials in 
my description of the post-war landscape, although I was unable to find nearly as many 
as they had.  I did not locate Toal and Dahlman’s article until well after fieldwork and 
much writing, so they had little influence on this study. 
Military geography has traditionally been concerned with the role of the physical 
landscape in shaping the outcome of wars and battles.7  Attention is rarely given to the 
influence of the cultural landscape or changes in that landscape caused by the war.  
McColl and Lohman have discussed the locational strategies for the placement of 
insurgent bases, but have done so from a Maoist model of revolutionary warfare, which 
can neither be applied universally nor in the case of Sierra Leone.8  In addition, terrain is 
                                                           
4
 Carl Dahlman and Gerard Toal, ‘Broken Bosnia: the localized geopolitics of displacement and return in 
two Bosnian places,’ Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95, 3 (2005), pp. 644-662. 
5
 Michael K. Steinberg and Matthew J. Taylor, ‘Public memory and political power in Guatemala’s 
postconflict landscape,’ The Geographical Review 93, 4 (2003), pp. 449-468. 
6
 Ghazi Falah, ‘The 1948 Israeli-Palestinian War and its aftermath: the transformation and designification 
of Palestine’s cultural landscape,’ Annals of the Association of American Geographers 86, 2 (1996), pp. 
256-285. 
7
 The most notable current works in military geography include: Eugene J. Palka & Francis A. Galgano 
(ed.), The Scope of Military Geography: Across the Spectrum from Peacetime to War (McGraw-Hill, New 
York, 2000); Michael Stephenson (ed.), Battlegrounds: Geography and the History of Warfare (National 
Geographic, Washington, D.C., 2003);  John M. Collins, ‘Military Geography for Professionals and the 
Public’ (Brassey’s, Washington, D.C., 1998); Harold A. Winters (ed.), Battling the Elements: Weather 
and Terrain in the Conduct of War (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1998); and Patrick 
O’Sulllivan, Terrain and Tactics (Greenwood Press, New York, 1991). 
8
 Andrew D. Lohman, ‘Insurgencies and counter-insurgencies: a geographical perspective,’ in Eugene J. 
Palka (ed.), The Scope of Military Geography (McGraw-Hill, New York, 2000) and Robert W. McColl, 
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understood as being universally perceived by different military forces because they have 
the same capabilities and limitations. 
 Although this study will take into account the role of physical geography, its 
implications for the war are not my primary concern.  In civil wars, it is the human 
geography, and more specifically the cultural landscape, that is the leading geographical 
mediator.  Dense vegetation or forbidding terrain may provide the shelter necessary to 
sustain and protect an insurgency, but the war must be won through control of the local 
populace. 
I have relied heavily on the works of two anthropologists, Doug Henry and Paul 
Richards.  Henry’s PhD. Dissertation is primarily concerned with the impacts of the war 
on health and bodies, though he often includes detailed information on the places that 
these bodies inhabit.  Richards’s numerous works span many topics related to the war, in 
which he has occasionally discussed geographic themes and often given good 
description of war-time places. 
I would like to emphasize the tremendous gap that exists in the literature, which 
this thesis is attempting to fill.  As we have seen, there are only a handful of works in 
cultural geography that examine changes in the cultural landscape during and after wars.  
Furthermore, none of these do so in a systematic manner, in order to understand how the 
landscape changed as a totality.  Instead, they examine one part of the landscape in order 
to emphasize a separate agenda.  In military geography equally few works have 
discussed the role of the cultural landscape, and they have done so in a very general 
fashion.  This thesis is original in that it has tackled both of these questions in a very 
detailed and systematic way.  First to describe the total change in the landscape as a 
result of the war, both during and after the war, and second, to understand the total 
influence of the landscape upon the course of the war.   
                                                                                                                                                                           
‘The insurgent state: territorial bases of revolution,’ Annals of the Association of American Geographers
59, 4 (1969), pp. 613-631. 
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Fieldwork and Research Methods 
 Fieldwork for this study was conducted over a two month period from May to 
July of 2005, in Kenema and Kailahun districts of the Eastern Province of Sierra Leone.  
While in this region, I visited twenty-eight villages, seven towns, three military bases, 
six former IDP camps, and two former rebel bases. (See Figure 1.) 
Figure 1:  Map of Study Region (Relief Map, 1976)
During these visits, I conducted semi-structured interviews with residents and 
former combatants in order to reconstruct the landscape history and gain more detailed 
local knowledge about the history of the war and its effects.  I also spent a significant 
amount of time on walking tours of these areas, taking pictures, making sketch maps, 
and noting observations.  In addition I visited the offices of many non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and local government officials (policemen, schoolteachers, clerks, 
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etc).  I did this research with the assistance of a local guide and translator, Ngiemah 
Jajuah (age nineteen), who spent most of his childhood in this region during the war.  He 
was present at many cities when they were under attack and lived in two of the IDP 
camps we visited, during his childhood.
 I chose this study region because it was where most of the fighting occurred 
during the first half of the war and could be understood as the cockpit of the war.  The 
majority of the population comes from the Mende ethnic group, which simplified my 
needs for a translator and guide.  The two districts of Kailahun and Kenema, which also 
represent the general border of the study region, were two of the three districts most 
affected by the war (to clarify Kenema and Kailahun are the names of two districts, and 
the largest cities in those districts). I chose not to include the third, Kono district, to the 
North, where much of the alluvial diamond mining occurs, because a different language 
was spoken there.  It also would have increased the size of my study region beyond 
manageable limits.  The selection of sites within the study region did not follow any 
scientific methodology or statistical selection procedure.  My choices were often a 
product of random influences and the vagaries of the transportation networks. 
The first major cluster of villages I visited, between Kenema and Blama, were 
chosen purely by accident.  After a motorcycle accident outside Wanjama, I was forced 
to wait several hours for transportation.  In the meantime, I spoke with some villagers 
who told me about being attacked during the war.  I met with the chief and learned about 
the attacks on his village and several other villages nearby.  These villages (Kpai, 
Wanjama, Njala, Serabu, Fabina, Taninahun, Weima Tokmombu and Handubu, Baiama 
I and II, Saama, and Giehun) were only about ten miles from Kenema, where I was 
lodging, so I decided to start there.  These villages were also within ten to twenty miles 
of the Zogoda, the rebel forest base and headquarters for much of the war, a site I also 
eventually visited.  While staying in Kenema, I befriended a Catholic priest, who took 
me to visit two villages near the Liberian border (Belabu and Faima).  After I felt I had 
collected enough information here, I moved on to Segbwema and Daru, two towns about 
seven miles apart.  From there I visited several villages in between them (Mofindo, 
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Mendekelema, Dambu, Tongoma, Yendema, and Baiama).  I also chartered 
transportation to visit four other villages, all about thirty miles away in different 
directions, which several different people mentioned I should visit (Bomaru, the first 
village attacked during the war; Giema, the site of a large rebel base; and Mendekelema 
and Neama, the site of mass graves).  Once I left Kenema, the transportation situation 
became very difficult and I was often limited to visiting sites within walking distance.  
The third sub-region I visited included the towns of Kailahun, Buedu, and Koindu.  I 
stayed here a short time and visited only two villages (Kunduwundu and Vaama).  The 
availability of transportation and lodging were severe limiting factors, which certainly 
biased my site choice to those relatively close to the towns. 
A typical day involved visiting one or two villages.  Upon arrival I would ask to 
meet with the chief to discuss the war and its impact on the village.  A white visitor to 
the village was a rare event and I often drew a large crowd, which proved helpful as their 
recollection of the events of the war could often turn into somewhat of a debate, yielding 
more accurate information.  During the interviews, I asked the following questions: 
1)  What was village like before the war (size, shape, population, facilities, house types)? 
2)  When was the village attacked (often multiple times)? 
3)  What happened when the village was attacked and/or occupied? 
4)  Where did the villagers flee?  
5)  When they returned, how did they rebuild and did they receive any assistance? 
6)  Did any Kamajors (tribal militia) or government soldiers help defend the village? 
7) How had the village change from before to the war the present time?   
These interviews took anywhere from one to three hours depending on the size of 
the crowd and the degree of cooperation I received from the chief.  After an interview, I 
would normally be taken on a tour of the village with someone appointed by the chief 
who was very knowledgeable about its history.  He would describe which houses were 
new, where old foundations lay, and point out the directions from which the rebels 
attacked and to which the villagers fled.  During this time, I often made some sort of 
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sketch map and took numerous photographs of house types and ruins.  Ngiemah and I 
also counted the number of houses and foundations, often revealing numbers wildly 
different from those we were told in the interview.
A major limitation of the interviews was how I was perceived by the locals.  The 
only contact most of these villagers had with whites was through representatives from 
NGOs coming to assess the damage inflicted on the village and what its needs were, in 
order to determine if it qualified for any kind of aid.  I quickly became aware of this 
problem when, at the end of the first few interviews, I asked if there was anything else 
they would like to tell me or if they had any questions for me.  Invariably, I was told 
about the extreme hardships of living that accompanied their abject poverty and was 
asked what I planned to do to help rebuild.  How many houses could my organization 
build, could we dig a well, build a clinic, or repair the road?  No matter how much time 
or effort I spent telling them that I was not an NGO representative, they never really 
understood.  I told them that there was nothing material I could offer them, that I was 
there to learn about their culture and document the effects of the war, and that the best I 
could do was try to inform others in the Untied States about the war and its devastating 
effects on their communities.  I tried to explain how embarrassed I was that most people 
in the United States had never even heard about Sierra Leone, let alone knew about the 
war.  Even after all this, the common response was “God bless you, we are grateful for 
your help, but please, we are begging you, please go tell George Bush about our village 
when you return to Texas, please ask him to send money.”  Although I will never know 
to what extent, their perception of me as someone who could give them aid certainly 
skewed their responses when conducting interviews. 
I also conducted semi-structured interviews with twenty-six ex-combatants from 
all three major factions (The Revolutionary United Front, Sierra Leone Army, and Civil 
Defense Forces) in order to gain more detailed information about how villages were 
attacked or defended, how they were perceived, and descriptions of the layout of rebel 
bases.  These interviews were shorter and did not always yield useful information.  After 
the war ended, the military was reconstituted and fighters from all three warring factions 
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were incorporated into the new institution.  Thus, anytime I visited a military base, I 
often began by interviewing one or two high commanders (majors or colonels) who 
served in the army during the war.  They would then assist me in locating a few enlisted 
soldiers or junior officers from each faction, whom I then tried to interview one by one.  
A few were extremely cooperative and provided much useful information, although most 
gave short, non-descript answers and were obviously hesitant to talk with me. 
Chapter Synopsis 
The remainder of the introduction sets the context of the study.  The first section 
describes the regional geography of Sierra Leone, focusing on broad physical and human 
themes, since more detailed information regarding the study region is provided later.  
The second section is a brief history of the war, outlining several characteristics of the 
conflict.  The remainder of this thesis is organized into three chapters. 
Chapter II is divided into four sections, by the morphological units of village, 
town, rebel forest base, and transportation network.  Each section describes the pre-war 
state of the feature and then discusses changes brought about during and after the war.  
In addition, there is a discussion of how each feature was attacked and defended, and 
how it influenced the course of the war.  This chapter seeks to identify the general 
patterns common across the study region. 
Chapter III is organized regionally as opposed to topically as in the previous 
chapter.  In this chapter the study region is divided into three sub-regions: between 
Kenema and Blama, between Daru and Segbwema, and the border areas of Kenema and 
Kailahun districts.  The events of the war for each sub-region are presented in great 
detail, followed by a description of the current condition of these places. 
Chapter IV concludes the work by reviewing the major changes that occurred in 
the landscape during the war.  The broader processes behind these changes will also be 
examined.  The influence of the four morphological units will be reevaluated by looking 
at how they coalesced to shape the war and how they led to three very different views of 
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the landscape for the three major factions.  I will finish with some recommendations for 
future studies. 
Geography of Sierra Leone 
  
Sierra Leone is a small country, about the size of South Carolina and roughly 
circular in shape.9 (See Figure 2.)  It is bordered by Guinea to the north and east, Liberia 
to the south and east, and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. The climate is tropical 
monsoon, leading to the highest annual rainfall in West Africa, which varies between 
two-hundred and fifty to one-hundred and fifty inches a year.  The year is divided 
between the dry season, lasting from November to April, and the rainy season, from May 
to October.  Vegetation varies from mangrove swamps along the coast to pockets of 
virgin rainforest surrounded by large areas of secondary bush (land abandoned for 
several decades) and farm bush (farm land left fallow up to fifteen years) throughout 
much of the interior.  The largest areas of rainforest lay along the Liberian border and in 
the southeast region.  There are nine major rivers, all flowing from the northeast border 
into the Atlantic.  These rivers have thin drainage basins and deeply incised channels 
along the middle and upper courses.  Water levels vary drastically with the seasons and 
only the lower courses are navigable. 
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 This description is compiled from:  John Clarke (ed.), Sierra Leone in Maps (University of London 
Press, London, 1969);  Irving Kaplan (ed.), Area Handbook for Sierra Leone (Department of Defense, 
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Use of It (Longman, London, 1980). 
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 Figure 2:  Map of Sierra Leone (Relief Map, 1976) 
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The country is commonly divided into four regions: the peninsula, coastal 
swamps, interior plains, and interior uplands.  The peninsula is less than two-hundred 
and fifty square miles, yet it includes the capitol city and a large mountain range, with 
elevations up to three-thousand feet.  Coastal swamps comprise a very thin strip, about 
ten to twenty miles wide, traversing the entire coastline.  Mangrove swamps occur at the 
mouths of rivers while the rest is seasonally flooded sedge swamp.  The interior plain 
stretches inland around one-hundred miles, and varies in elevation between one-hundred 
feet to seven-hundred feet.  Vegetation in this region is mostly secondary bush and farm 
bush.  The upland region can be divided into a large plateau in the north, and an area of 
rolling hills further to the south and east. To the north, the rivers have cut deep valleys 
while in the south and east they have created a highly dissected hilly landscape.  The 
northern plateau area has many small mountain ranges and large hill masses.  Most of 
this region is composed of open savannahs, with elevations ranging from one-thousand 
four-hundred feet to two-thousand feet. To the  south and east the terrain is made up of 
rolling hills varying from five-hundred feet to one-thousand feet in elevation.  Much of 
this area is secondary forest and farm bush with isolated pockets of primary rainforest. 
The current population is near five million and is comprised of a dozen major 
ethnic groups, the largest of which are the Mende and the Temne.  Each ethnic group 
speaks their own language, though Krio, a form of Pidgin English, is widely spoken 
throughout the country and formal English is not uncommon.  A majority of the 
population is Muslim, while a small percentage is Christian; however, both of these 
blend elements of traditional animist religious beliefs.  The country is divided into three 
provinces (Northern, Southern, and Eastern) and the Western Area which comprises the 
peninsula.  The three provinces are further divided into twelve districts and each of these 
districts have between ten and twenty chiefdoms.  Chiefdoms are the main political unit 
and are governed by paramount chiefs, who wield considerable power and autonomy.  
Each chiefdom might contain anywhere from a few dozen to almost a hundred villages. 
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History and Nature of the War 
The causes of the war in Sierra Leone are a heated topic of debate in the 
scholarly literature.  Sorting out which of these arguments best describes the conflict is a 
fruitless task.  Instead, I believe they simply describe different aspects of the war.  In a 
recent book, James Hillman argues that we can never explain the causes of a given war, 
instead the best we can hope for is to understand how it happened by looking at the 
reasons that led up to it, be they historical, social, political, or economic.10   
With regards to the war in Sierra Leone, the reasons were many.  The immediate 
cause was the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) raid into Bomaru with the backing of 
Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).  The proximate cause 
was the student radicalism of the 1970’s and 1980’s which led some to eventually seek 
revolutionary warfare training in Libya.11  The underlying causes were numerous:  a 
history of peasant revolt against political corruption,12 a violent and contested social 
history preserved into the present,13 a climate of political repression and violence,14 and 
constantly declining economic conditions.  There was also an abundance of propelling 
causes:  the presence of lootable economic resources that were easily traded for military 
supplies, the involvement of several mercenary firms, the intervention of multiple 
outside powers, and the massive influx of humanitarian aid. 
David Keen has written a very nuanced work on the history and nature of the 
conflict.  He argues that the underlying causes of the war were largely internal, while the 
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conditions in Liberia were simply the spark that ignited a multitude of grievances that 
had accumulated over the past three decades.  These grievances were rooted in the 
deterioration and reformulation of the political system following independence in 1961 
and especially during the reign of Siaka Stevens between 1965 and 1985.    
The results of these political changes included the decline in state-provided 
education, institutionalization of corruption, ethnicization of the Army, violent 
intimidation of political and civil society opposition, rise of illegal diamond mining, 
declining state revenues, deterioration of the transportation infrastructure, severe 
economic decline, and the increased power of paramount chiefs at the local level, whose 
rule was often seen as arbitrary and corrupt.  By the time the war broke out in 1991 there 
was little left of a centralized bureaucratic state to maintain order, while a large portion 
of the population, especially young men, felt excluded socially and economically, 
allowing them to turn to the gun when the opportunity arose.15
Phase I
The war began when the RUF, assisted by the NPFL, crossed the Liberian border 
into Sierra Leone in March of 1991.16  These forces, divided into a northern and southern 
flank each containing a few hundred fighters, made quick gains in the Eastern Province.  
Their activities focused on directly engaging Sierra Leone Army (SLA) forces for 
control of towns and villages, followed by occupation, where upon they were converted 
into training and supply camps.  The SLA was able to largely contain this offensive 
within six months, with assistance from the Guinean Army, civilian hunters recruited as 
irregular scouts, and Liberian irregulars opposed to the NPFL. Soon thereafter in 1992, a 
small group of junior officers within the SLA staged a coup and installed themselves as 
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 David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (James Currey, Oxford, 2005), p. 8-35. 
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and Author Unknown ‘Findings and recommendations of the Sierra Leone truth and reconciliation 
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the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), with the goal of ending the war 
quickly by enlarging the army and launching a counteroffensive.   
During this time, rifts were forming between the RUF and the NPFL over the 
conduct of the war.  The NPFL made up a majority of the combat forces and also 
supervised the training of conscripts, giving them a high degree of control over rebel 
operations.  Elements of the RUF grew upset with the NPFL over their atrocities, 
looting, and unwillingness to allow the Sierra Leoneans to take charge of the fighting.  
This dispute eventually developed into all out fighting between the two groups, followed 
by the withdrawal of NPFL forces to Liberia.  Already severely weakened by infighting, 
the RUF was devastated by the SLA offensive, launched early in 1993.  Only a few 
towns in the far north east of Kailahun district remained in rebel control when the NPRC 
decided to declare a ceasefire in December.   
Phase II 
 In late 1994, what remained of the RUF emerged reborn from an isolated forest 
preserve near the Liberian border where they had been hiding.  They now fought by a 
very different set of rules, acting as a guerilla insurgency whose brutality towards the 
general population simultaneously sought to control them through fear and delegitemize 
the government and the army (combined in the NPRC).  This strategy was accomplished 
through the gradual establishment of a network of remote jungle bases from where 
incessant raids were launched against towns and villages.  At the same time, ambushes 
were laid along all of the major highways, isolating large parts of the country and 
severely inhibiting the movement of the SLA.  This new method proved extremely 
effective.  By early 1995, the RUF controlled large parts of the interior and had a large 
force positioned only miles from Freetown, while the SLA was barely holding a string of 
isolated towns overflowing with displaced villagers.   
 One characteristic of the war that became more pronounced during Phase II was 
the figure of the sobel—soldier by day, rebel by night.  The SLA was well known for 
indiscriminate looting of areas that had been attacked by the RUF.  The drastic 
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expansion of the SLA under the NPRC led to a marked decline in the moral qualities of 
ordinary soldiers, who were capable of looting, killing civilians, and in some cases 
colluding with the enemy.  This already poor image of the SLA was ruined by RUF 
false-flag operations, in which rebels wearing captured uniforms carried out numerous 
attacks on villages and committed atrocities under the guise of the SLA. 
Were it not for the appearance of two new actors the RUF might have achieved 
victory.  The large number of villagers living in Internally Displaced Person (IDP) 
camps at towns throughout the country began to organize themselves into self-sufficient 
militias.  The most successful of these were the Kamajors, based in the Mende 
Southeast.  Starting in 1995 they slowly began taking back the bush from the RUF, 
defending their villages, and launching raids against RUF strongholds. Militias and 
irregular hunter groups were influential actors from the beginning of the war but it was 
only during Phase II that this influence became substantial.  During Phase I both the 
Tamoboras and the Donsos, based in the Kurankuro and Kono ethnic groups, acted as 
irregular scouts for the SLA.  It was also common during RUF assaults on the larger 
towns of Bo, Kenema, and Freetown for youth vigilante groups to self-organize and help 
repel the invaders, in some cases even enforcing curfews to prohibit soldiers from 
looting.  As the war progressed other militias and hunting societies arose, each particular 
to a specific ethnic group, but the Kamajors were by far the largest, most well organized, 
and most effective of these groups. 
The other new actor was a South African mercenary company, Executive 
Outcomes (EO), hired by the NPRC in mid 1995.  EO and the Kamajors began working 
together and over the next year were able to reopen several highways, recapture several 
economically productive regions, and destroy several important RUF forest bases.  The 
RUF was weakened to the point that elections were held in 1996, with the new president 
opening peace talks and combining the various militias and irregular hunting societies 
into the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), a new formal branch of the armed services.  With 




The rising power of the CDF fostered resentment among the SLA, who saw the 
CDF as usurping their role.  At the same time, the CDF did not trust the SLA, whom 
they suspected of collaborating with the enemy and using their position of power for 
personal enrichment.  Relations between the two factions gradually worsened through 
1996 and 1997 and led to a host of skirmishes across the country.  In May of 1997, 
fearing the Army was soon to be disbanded; elements of the SLA staged another coup, 
calling themselves the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.  The first act of this brutal 
regime was to invite the rebels to come out of the bush and share power, an offer that 
they gladly accepted.  The CDF were ordered to disband, which they of course refused.  
These events set the stage for the next round of conflict between the CDF and various 
peacekeeping groups against the combined forces of the Army and rebels. 
Phase III
The CDF were greatly outnumbered by the combined forces of the AFRC and 
were forced to go into hiding to survive.  The war now took on the character of a 
counter-insurgency campaign perpetuated by the AFRC against the CDF.  Small scale 
operations and fighting continued over the next year, leading up to the country wide 
attack on AFRC supply lines known as “Black December” at the end of the year.  In 
February of 1998, Nigeria and Guinea decided to intervene substantially by committing 
a force of several thousand peacekeepers, known as ECOMOG.  After first recapturing 
Freetown, ECOMOG slowly pushed through the interior, retaking most of the major 
towns from the AFRC.  In this effort they were assisted by the CDF.  RUF and AFRC 
forces fled to both the Northern Province and the RUF heartland in the north-east 
Kailahun District, where they regrouped.   
Heavy fighting continued throughout much of 1998, with AFRC forces directly 
engaging ECOMOG for control over key towns.  This operation culminated in the 
devastating AFRC attack on Freetown in January of 1999, which was coordinated with 
other large scale operations throughout the country.  A peace agreement followed which 
allowed Foday Sankoh to share power with the elected President, Tejan Kabbah, but 
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fighting soon resumed.  Beginning after the attack on Freetown, but especially after the 
arrest of Foday Sankoh in 2000, the RUF and AFRC began to splinter into several 
smaller groups.  Both the United Nations and Britain decided to send peacekeeping 
forces in 1999 and 2000 and though small scale fighting continued, by the end of 2001 
the war was mostly over.  The official date for the end of the war was January of 2002, 





MORPHOLOGICAL UNITS:  ELEMENTS OF  
THE CULTURAL LANDSCAPE OF SIERRA LEONE
What were thriving villages in some areas are now mud 
ruins being overtaken by rainforest.  Houses, markets, 
schools, roads, and religious institutions are destroyed. 
Doug Henry 
Embodied Violence: War and Relief along the Sierra Leone Border 
PhD Dissertation Describing Fieldwork in 1997 and 1998
  
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the major morphological units of the 
cultural landscape of Sierra Leone and to describe how they changed during and after the 
war.  The aim is to identify patterns common across the study region.  In the next 
chapter, the individual study regions will be historically examined in detail.  These 
findings are based on accounts and observations collected during fieldwork with relevant 
information from secondary sources included.  As a cautionary note, I wish to preempt 
any reading that concludes the features described were ever uniform, fall into neat 
phases, or were static for large periods of the war.  Instead, the most striking feature of 
the landscape was its amorphous character.  The appearance of consistency that this 
chapter may induce, is solely a narrative device, allowing the different elements of the 
landscape to be introduced, described, and understood in a coherent manner. 
Villages 
 In Sierra Leone, about sixty-eight percent of the pre-war population lived in 
dispersed and often remote villages.1  These villages varied greatly in size and shape 
across the country, with the smallest having a population of less than a hundred and the 
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largest several thousand.  There were approximately sixteen-thousand villages scattered 
across the country, yielding an average size of two-hundred and twenty inhabitants.2  
This diffuse settlement pattern probably went furthest to influence the course of the war 
and it was also the part of the landscape most affected by the war.  
Pre-war Morphology
Within the study region, a typical pre-war village ranged in size from a few 
hundred to a few thousand inhabitants, with anywhere from fifty to two-hundred 
structures.  A handful of major house types and construction methods were common in 
these areas.  By size, these houses varied from small one room circular huts to the 
medium sized dwelling of two to three rooms up to the large well-constructed houses 
with five or more rooms.  Other buildings in the village included the court barri (a 
gathering pavilion), cooking huts, smaller barris for lounging, a church or a mosque, and 
sometimes a school or a clinic. (See Figure 3.) 
The size of a structure was closely related to the construction material.  Most 
small and some medium homes were wattle and daub with a thatched roof.  A better 
quality, medium sized home would have mud-brick walls or a concrete finish along the 
walls with a zinc-plated iron roof. (See Figure 4.)  The larger houses consistently had 
mud-brick walls, sometimes with a concrete finish.  Some larger houses had concrete 
block walls, while zinc roofs were standard.  Invariably, the larger houses belonged to 
people of wealth or stature such as the chief, a government official, or a merchant.  Some 
of the medium houses and several of the larger houses had a concrete façade or porch 
with pillars and steps.  According to the 1985 census, the average house construction 
materials for Kenema and Kailahun Districts were ninety percent zinc and ten percent 
thatch for roofs, while wall material was thirty percent concrete and seventy percent 
mud.3   
                                                           
2
 ‘Final Results: 2004 Population and Housing Census’ (Statistics Sierra Leone, Freetown, 2006), p. 1.  
Though this figure comes from after the war, I doubt these numbers have changed significantly.  The 
average should not to be confused with the mode, which probably lies between three-hundred and five-
hundred.
3
 Kandeh, ‘1985 Census of Population and Housing,’ p. 228-230.
 22 
   Figure 3: Court Barri and Homes (Kpai, Nongowa Chiefdom) 
   Figure 4:  A Typical Pre-war House (Yendema, Njaluahun Chiefdom) 
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   Figure 5:  A Typical Farm (Wanjama, Nongowa Chiefdom) 
     Figure 6:  A Typical Farm baffa (Wanjama, Nongowa Chiefdom) 
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The village cannot be understood outside the context of its environs, most 
importantly the numerous farms linked to it by bush paths.  A typical farm was about  
one-quarter to one-half hectare with roughly one farm per family. (See Figures 5 and 6.)  
They practiced a shifting form of cultivation with average fallow periods of seven to ten 
years.  During the first year, mainly rice was planted. Then, in the second year a variety 
of crops such as ground nuts, cassava, bananas, corn, and peppers were grown.  A 
village of three-hundred people might have twenty to thirty farms under cultivation and 
many more in a fallow state.  The bush paths that link these farms are numerous and 
winding, with many forks, some hidden.  Certain paths lead to skisiahun, secret bush 
hiding places, where valuables and harvests are occasionally stored, and where the 
villagers could hide when in danger.4 There were also the secret society bushes.  The 
Sande Grove (women’s initiation society) is often located on the edge or very close to 
the village, while the Poro Grove (men’s initiation society) lay further in the bush. 
In some places, the remnants of the pre-colonial war-town settlement pattern 
were still evident.  In this pattern small villages were connected in a hierarchical fashion, 
with a large central village of several thousand inhabitants ringed by several smaller 
villages of a few hundred inhabitants each, were still evident.  In pre-colonial times, 
warriors and civilians lived in the central village, which was surrounded by several 
smaller hamlets where slaves worked on farms.5
Attack and Defense
Attacks on villages can be divided into four categories.  Grouped by increasing 
level of intensity, they were: minor raid, occupation, major raid, and raze.  Every village 
had a unique story and not all of them fit neatly into these ideal/typical categories. 
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1)  Minor Raid:  These types of attacks were more common towards the end of the 
war—during and after the time of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).  In 
a minor raid, rebels or soldiers would enter the village shooting, scattering the villagers 
into the bush for the next few hours or days until it was safe to return, and take the easily 
lootable property, mostly animals and agricultural yields, while inflicting little or no 
damage on the village or its occupants.  These raids were short, but frequent—happening 
several times within the same year to the same village.  
2)  Occupation:  In this type of attack, which was more common at the beginning of the 
war, the object was to capture the village and convert it into a rebel base.  These attacks 
attempted to selectively destroy and profane elements of the village landscape.  
Generally, only a few buildings were destroyed, such as the houses of the chief, 
government representatives, or merchants.  These men were then publicly tortured and 
killed.6 Sometimes, their heads were placed on poles in the center of the village.  The 
sacred sites of the Poro and Sande secret societies were publicly entered and desecrated 
while the rebels danced around in the villager’s masks and outfits reserved for special 
rituals.7  In this type of attack, the landscape became one medium through which 
existing symbols of power were destroyed and profaned to signify rebel control.  The 
villagers were gathered in the court barri and told they were being liberated from the 
corrupt APC regime and that their laws no longer applied.  New laws were created in 
their place.  One change was that no doors were to be locked and all possessions were to 
be evenly distributed, allowing the rebels to loot the village with ease.  Skisiahun were
looted with the help of rebel informants. Also, young men were conscripted and trained 
as fighters, within or very close to the village.  
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3)  Major Raid:  This type of attack, the most common throughout the war, but 
especially between 1994 and 1997, sought to loot and depopulate the village.8  As in the 
other types of raid, the main purpose was to gather supplies, but these supplies were not 
limited to food.  Two of the most precious commodities were zinc roofs and conscripts.  
When the rebels entered, they would kill a few people and burn down the mosque, 
church, school, clinic, and the homes of important people.  Most villagers would escape 
into the bush, but several were captured and subsequently became porters or fighters.  
The loot was gathered and the conscripts were forced to carry it to the nearest base, at 
least ten to twenty miles away.  With the zinc roofs missing, it was only a matter of time 
in the tropical monsoon climate before rows of foundations and rubble were all that 
remained.  After the rebel attack, it was common for soldiers to come and carry away 
what was left on trucks to sell at the nearest town.9  Those villagers who ran into the 
bush would hide at their farms or skisiahun.10  Some lived there for several weeks or 
months before undertaking the dangerous journey to the nearest town.  As news of these 
attacks spread and the infamous reputation of the rebels grew, villagers began to flee 
with the first rumor of rebel activity nearby. 
4)  Raze:  During a raze, the entire village was destroyed and all of its occupants either 
fled or were killed.  This type of attack was uncommon, as the factions were more 
concerned with controlling the population than eliminating it.  Though this was not a 
consistent strategy, it did occasionally occur in response to a perceived serious injustice.  
For example, one village was burned down by AFRC fighters who learned that the 
villagers had been helping local Kamajors. In another instance, NPFL forces destroyed a 
village that was the site of serious infighting between their own forces and the RUF 
during the early part of the war.  After the split in 1992, NPFL forces practiced a 
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scorched Earth policy, destroying many villages along its return path to Liberia.11  
Villages that became battlegrounds between different forces could easily be destroyed 
indirectly due to the fighting and sometimes the victor would destroy the village if the 
occupants had sided with their enemy, such as in the large village of Mendekilema 
(Gaura Chiefdom). 
 Some villages were defended from attack, mostly by Kamajors, though, in the 
first five years of the war, it was not unheard of for soldiers to protect a village.  When 
the soldiers defended, they set up checkpoints at all the entrances, dug trenches along 
likely directions of attack, and sometimes took the zinc roofs from houses to construct 
barricades.  Normally, the soldiers deployed forces of platoon strength at large, 
strategically important villages—such as at major road junctions or near the entrances to 
towns. The Kamajors, however, defended in a completely different fashion.  Instead of 
erecting fixed defenses, they went on nightly patrols and lay in ambush for rebels or 
soldiers moving along surrounding bush paths.  At other times, they would distribute 
themselves around the edge of the village and wait for an attack, at which time they 
would all charge the rebels or soldiers with their machetes and shotguns.  When the 
rebels did occupy villages, there does not seem to have been any organized defense, 
though they sometimes lay in ambush along the main roads and trails when they were 
expecting an attack. 
 Villages played the most important role in influencing the general course of the 
war.  The pertinent characteristics of villages were the dispersed pattern in which they 
were spread across the countryside, the relative remoteness (many were accessible only 
by bush path), and the open layout that did not lend itself to organized defense.  These 
factors combined to make villages a prime target for the different types of attack.  This 
quality, exploited by the RUF throughout the war, provided them with several 
opportunities:  to delegitemize the government by showing its inability to protect its own 
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citizens, to control the civilian population through fear, and to serve as a source of 
resources in terms of food, loot, and conscripts.  In contrast, villages were seen as a risk 
by the SLA:  first as potential RUF support camps, later as indefensible locations, and 
finally as hiding places for Kamajors.  For these reasons, few resources were devoted to 
their protection.  Eventually, the Kamajors made villages into a risk for the RUF by 
making raids on villages more costly, if not impossible, and by using villages as a base 
of operations from which attacks on rebel forest bases could be launched. 
Wartime Changes 
In areas where the pre-colonial settlement pattern was still clear, there was a 
tendency to abandon the hamlets and concentrate the population into the central village.  
In some places, these central villages grew to five-thousand or more inhabitants, 
receiving food shipments from NGO’s and protection from Kamajors and soldiers.  
Agricultural practices also adapted to the new environment of violence.  Some people 
chose to remain in their villages despite the fighting, while others risked visiting their 
farms during harvest times, spending the rest of their time hiding in the bush or living in 
towns.12  Due to the chance of ambush and capture, especially while isolated on the 
farm, swamp rice farms were abandoned because of the small field of view they 
afforded, and farming efforts were focused instead on the upland rice farms along hill 
sides.13  Since the rebels normally attacked during the rice harvest, a rice scarcity 
developed and second-year farms became the primary source of food.  These farms were 
more concealed, due to their overgrown character. 
During lulls in the fighting, many villagers returned to rebuild.  This 
reconstruction occurred mostly around the 1994 ceasefire, 1996 elections, and as 
chiefdoms were slowly secured by Kamajors and ECOMOG between 1998 and 2000.  
Life could be very difficult for those returning before the war ended, because they 
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received little or no assistance by the government or NGOs.  Doug Henry describes the 
process for those leaving the camps: 
If left to their own abilities, self-resettling refugees usually begin 
little by little.  Men will go back first to rebuild a house, taking 
enough bulgher wheat or “corn-soya  blend” from the camp in 
order to stay and work for several days, and then come back to  
the camp to resupply, and bring news of the area to one’s waiting 
family.  Smaller, 1 to 2  room, stick-frame mud houses are 
preferable to mud brick, as these can be completed in only several 
days.  This back and forth process may go on for several weeks or 
months until it is deemed appropriate to take more family 
members back.14
A similar process, taking several months to a year, was described to me by many 
villagers who resided in towns during the war.  A number of villagers also told stories of 
returning only to be attacked after several houses were complete, all easily torched due 
to their thatch construction.  In some villages, such events were repeated many times. 
Post-war Changes
 When I visited these villages in 2005, their character was different from what it 
had been before and during the war.  They were ramshackle shadows of villages 
comprised of small, fragile homes and littered with piles of rubble and bare foundations.  
They were reduced in population and area, as well as often being laid out in a different 
fashion as well. (See Figures 7 and 8.)  In every village I visited, save one, the 
population was less than before the war.  These reductions in size ranged from as little as 
ten percent to as much as seventy-five percent.  These population changes depended 
upon the size of the village. (See Table 1.)  Small and large villages saw the largest 
decreases in population.  In contrast, medium villages only saw moderate changes, while 
very large villages maintained a post-war population roughly equal to their pre-war 
population.  
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    Figure 7:  View of Fabinah Village (Nongowa Chiefdom) 
    Figure 8:  View of Faima Village (Nomo Chiefdom) 
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TABLE 1 
Average Population Change Based on Village Size 
Village Type Pre-war Size  Average Population Decline # in Sample 
Small 200 or less 70% to abandonment 6 
Medium 200 to 1000 10% to 30% 13 
Large 1000 to 4000 50% 5 
Very Large 4000 or more Roughly Even (+/- 10%) 3 
Source:  Fieldwork 
 I believe this pattern is related to the two major constraints on rebuilding a 
village—labor and time.  Materials were not an important factor since most of these 
structures were built from what was locally available.  Time was important because, if 
the village could not be built quickly enough, those waiting for a home might decide to 
remain in a town or to move to a nearby village that was being rebuilt faster.  
Reconstruction was a communal project in which labor was organized by the chief, 
yielding a new wattle and daub house every three to four days.  Small villages could not 
muster the requisite labor and their inhabitants may have been inclined to migrate to 
larger villages nearby.  Medium villages struck a nice balance—they had enough labor, 
but not too much of a work load to complete before people grew tired of waiting.  Large 
villages certainly had enough labor, but the task of rebuilding two-hundred or more 
structures may have been too daunting for a large portion of the population.  Very large 
villages had a great deal of infrastructure in place and were often sited in desirable 
locations, raising the incentives to rebuild.  Also, chiefs in these villages were able to 
wield considerably more power and could summon more resources in the form of labor, 
government aid, and NGO aid to commit to the rebuilding initiative.   
Another factor is that the reconstruction process is not complete.  Many people 
saw their wattle and daub houses as temporary shelters to be used until they could afford 
or receive aid to build a better home.  In ever village, new houses were under 
construction, a process which was hindered by the constant upkeep required of wattle  
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Figure 9:  A Typical Postwar Wattle and Daub House (Wanjama, Nongowa 
Chiefdom) 
    Figure 10:  Several NGO-built Houses (Weima Tokmombu, Small Bo Chiefdom)
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and daub dwellings.  It will be several years, perhaps decades, before these villages 
return to some semblance of their pre-war condition. 
These hypotheses still do not explain the across the board drop in village 
populations in this region.  From what villagers told me, there were three major causes 
for the population decline: death, migration to a different region of the country, and 
migration to a nearby city.  Death and regional migration could account for at most a 
five percent population drop over the course of the war, which is minor compared to the 
three percent annual growth rate.  The remaining population decline can only be 
attributed to a substantial number of displaced people choosing to remain in towns after 
the war.  This process will described in more detail in the next section of this chapter. 
There were also numerous changes in the layout and consistency of villages.  
Each village was rebuilt atop the remains of its predecessor, but did not always 
encompass the same area. The most basic changes were the house types, new in size and 
construction material.  Before the war most houses were either mud-brick or concrete 
with zinc roofs   Now most houses were wattle and daub, some were mud brick, and a 
lucky few had concrete walls, often the work of an NGO. (See Figures 9 and 10.)  The 
proportion of zinc roofs varied between thirty percent and fifty percent, with the lower 
numbers being more common.  These zinc roofs were not the new silver kind found in 
town, but rather old, rusted, and brown.  In addition, a ring of ruins, either in the form of 
piles of rubble or bare foundations, was often spread around the edge of the new village. 
(See Figures 11-14.) 
Assistance from NGO’s was very patchy and did not seem to follow any 
noticeable pattern at the small scale—for instance, in a cluster of villages, all equally 
damaged, you might find one that had received aid.  At the scale of the entire Eastern 
Province, there was an observable and stated belief that Kailahun district was much 
more devastated than Kenema district, and deserved more aid.  From my observations, 
these regions were equally devastated.  Several NGO officials stressed the difficulties 
involved in the fair and equitable distribution of 
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    Figure 11:  Remains of a House Foundation (Baiama II, Small Bo Chiefdom) 
    Figure 12:  Façade Remains of a House (Kpai, Nongowa Chiefdom) 
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    Figure 13:  Another House Foundation  (Weima Tokmombu, Small Bo Chiefdom) 
    Figure 14:  Remains of a Well-built House  (Weima Handubu, Small Bo Chiefdom)
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or two non-natives managing several native employees, whose responsibility it was to 
select and oversee the day to day projects.  They were notorious for funneling aid into 
villages where they had friends or family members and in some instances only giving aid 
to those chiefs willing to pay the highest bribe.  Considering the state of living 
conditions in the country, it is difficult to condemn this behavior.
Towns 
Before the war, around twenty-eight percent of the population lived in towns, the 
largest of which were Freetown (469,000), Koidu-Sefadu (82,000), Bo (59,000), 
Kenema (52,000) and Makeni (40,000).  The remaining small towns, of which there 
were roughly one-hundred, had a maximum size of fifteen-thousand inhabitants, though 
the average was between three-thousand and five-thousand.15  Most large towns owe 
their origins and dominance to transportation networks created in the early twentieth 
century, notably the construction of the railroad linking Freetown to the interior in 1898.  
These towns grew up as classic trading entrepots, supplying a rural hinterland providing 
agricultural, mineral, and forest resources to Freetown.16   
 Despite the destruction caused by the war, it was clear from my observations that 
smaller towns could be divided into two categories, evident by their layout. (See Figures 
15-18.)  Some towns had very clear commercial strips or central business districts, with 
a variety of shops and government offices.  There was obvious development in 
infrastructure, in the form of wide roads or their remains flanked by multi-story 
buildings.  Blama, Segbwema, Pendembu, and Koindu fell into this category.  Other 
towns were more uniform in the spacing and types of buildings seen.  It seemed as if 
these towns had originally been large villages, which slowly changed into places of trade 
and commerce.  Towns of this nature included Daru, Kailahun, and Buedu.  
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    Figure 15:  A View of Blama 
    Figure 16:  A View of Buedu 
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    Figure 17:  A View of Daru 
    Figure 18:  A View of Kenema
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Attack and Defense
  Initially, the RUF was strong enough to make quick advances and towns were 
captured with ease.  This lasted until they were finally halted in Daru and Koidu-Sefadu 
in late 1991.  A revamped SLA reclaimed many towns during the NPRC 
counteroffensive of 1992 and 1993, leaving only the most remote towns of Kailahun 
district in rebel hands.  During Phase II, the rebels were numerically weak and focused 
on raiding and isolating towns.  Following the AFRC coup of 1997, the rebels came to 
control many of the towns jointly with the Army.  It was only after the arrival of 
ECOMOG forces, who were assisted by the Kamajors, that the balance of forces was 
roughly equal, leading both sides to risk battle for control over towns during much of 
1998 and 1999. This fighting can be divided into three categories: occupation and 
looting, raiding, and destruction. 
1)  Occupation and Looting:  In this type of attack, a town was captured with little or no 
fighting and any damage done came later, in the form of looting.  This type of attack 
occurred most often during Phase I, though later in the war, this looting followed more 
sustained fighting.  Common lootable items included zinc roofs and valuable objects 
stored inside homes and buildings, but they could go as far as removing the windows 
and doors from every structure in the town.  A frequent sequence of events began with 
the rebels capturing a town with out fighting, followed by looting and limited 
redistribution of the town’s resources.  If the town was recaptured by the SLA, the 
looting was often much worse, especially during the NPRC counteroffensive.17
2)  Raiding:  This type of attack, widely perpetrated by the RUF during Phase II, could 
take a variety of forms, though it generally involved the infiltration of a small force to 
attack a specific target.  Sometimes the raids were quick, eliminating the target and 
retreating back into the bush before a response could be mounted, while at other times 
battles lasting several days occurred.  Common targets included the homes and offices of 
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politicians, Army officers, Kamajor leaders, and government clerks and officials.  At 
other times raids were carried out against IDP camps and public spaces in Bo and 
Kenema.  These raids offered little material reward, though their psychological impact 
was immeasurable.  They served to eliminate or suppress the military and political 
leadership of the town, as well as adding to the atmosphere of panic and fear among the 
towns people, further delegitemizing the government by showing its inability to provide 
security. 
3)  Full-Scale Battle:  As one might imagine, this type of attack involved two forces 
fighting for control of a town, often within the town itself.  These “battles” occurred in a 
handful of places during the first two years of the war, were completely absent during 
the middle years, and then reappeared with much greater frequency and intensity 
towards the end of the war, especially in 1998 and 1999.    The RUF and Kamajors were 
mostly limited to assault rifles and rocket propelled grenades as opposed to the SLA and 
ECOMOG, who had a range of light tanks, armored cars, and mortars, which could 
cause considerable devastation.  In many towns fought over during this time, hardly a 
single original building in the town center was left standing.  In some cases, sheer 
firepower may have been used to intentionally level a whole town. 
Although it is clear that most towns were defended throughout the war, defense 
was fairly disorganized.  The essential elements seem to have been a network of 
checkpoints placed around and inside the town, with machine guns located at the major 
entrances.  When attacked, the soldiers or militia defending the town would simply rally 
on the site of the fighting.  Considering the sprawling nature of many towns and the 
small garrisons assigned to protect them, this tactic probably represented the best plan. 
The rebels proved adept at bypassing these defenses and were routinely able to enter, 
attack, and sometimes leave before a response could be mounted.  In some cases, crowds 
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of civilians would overpower the rebels, when they were few in number and lightly 
armed.18
Whereas villages influenced the war in a very general way, the role of towns was 
much more specific.  There was an implicit belief that control of the country was based 
in control of the towns, evident in the operations of the various factions.  The RUF’s 
original war plan was to capture Bo, which would then be used as base from which the 
rest of the country could be taken.19  During Phase II, attacks on villages, the ambushing 
of highways, and the sites of forest bases were all planned around the intended isolation 
and raiding of specific towns.  This strategy was most obvious during Phase III, when 
high-profile attacks on villages diminished, while most of the fighting moved to the 
towns, culminating in the 1999 attack on Freetown.  The important characteristics of 
towns were their small number, highly uneven distribution, sprawling layout, 
concentrations of wealth, and position at the nexus points for the main roads.  For these 
reasons the capture, raiding, or isolation of a town became the centerpiece of many 
operations during the war. 
Other Wartime Changes
Several of the most important changes are related to the large population 
fluctuations caused by the movement of displaced people fleeing from the rebel advance.  
Most towns that became magnets for displaced persons, such as Bo, Kenema, 
Segbwema, and Daru, probably doubled and at times tripled or quadrupled in population.  
When fleeing from the rebel advance, most villagers went straight to the nearest town 
where they sought refuge with friends or family members.  Those lacking relations 
simply squatted on vacant property, at schools, or on land near the edge of town.  
Eventually, these numbers grew to the point that a variety of NGO’s began to create 
camps for these displaced people.  One study claims there were at least sixty different 
IDP camps spread across the country in 1999 with a total recorded displaced population 
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near six-hundred thousand.20  It is likely that these figures are too high as camp 
administrators routinely over exaggerated the number of camp dwellers to receive more 
aid.  The numbers living in camps were, however, only a fraction of the total displaced 
population, a large part of which lived with their extended families or camped out on 
vacant property. 
 These camps, built on the outskirts or within a few miles of the town, were laid 
out like small communities.  They varied in area between one-quarter to one square mile 
and in size between a few thousand inhabitants to as many as fifteen-thousand to twenty-
thousand. (See Figure 19.)  The residents lived in hundreds of small wattle and daub 
shelters with NGO supplied plastic sheeting as a roof. (See Figure 20.)  These dwellings 
made up most of the camp and stretched out along roads in every direction.  The larger 
camps of five-thousand or more were built around a clinic, often a school, and a 
dispensary.  Other buildings might include a court barri, church, mosque, market area, 
midwife’s hut, soccer fields, and sometimes an administrative office.  The size and 
extent of these camps were constantly changing in response to the distribution of aid and 
the conditions of the war.21
 Other changes to towns were implemented by the faction that occupied it, often 
appropriating buildings for their own use.  It was common for the rebels to move into 
police stations and use them as a base of operations, while primary schools were often 
converted into makeshift training camps.  Checkpoints were commonly used by all sides 
who wished to limit the movement of spies hiding among the civilian population.  Once, 
when walking the streets of Kenema with my guide Ngiemah, he remarked that during 
the war we would have had to cross through six checkpoints manned by government 
soldiers to traverse this far into town from the highway.  The Kamajors were notorious 
for taking over large buildings, especially hotels, to use as barracks.22  One such building  
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Figure 19:  A Section of RTI IDP Camp, Near Kenema (Photograph courtesy of Doug 
Henry) 
Figure 20:  A Typical Dwelling in Majihun Road IDP Camp, near Segbwema 
(Photograph courtesy of Doug Henry)
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was pointed out to me in Kenema, while another, the Brookfields Hotel in Freetown, has 
been extensively documented in the work of Daniel Hoffman.23
Post-War Changes 
  After the war, the population of towns across the country was radically different 
from what it had been before the war. (See Table 2.)  Freetown, Bo, and Kenema all 
outpaced the average national population growth due to immigration of around one-
hundred thousand, sixty-thousand, and fifty-thousand new residents, respectively.  It is 
not surprising that Koidu-Sefadu, the diamond capitol, barely maintained its pre-war 
population, since it was bitterly fought over throughout the war and changed hands at 
least six times.  The remaining small towns experienced either rampant growth or 
stagnation with moderate declines. 
TABLE 2 
Population Changes in Major Towns and those in Study Region Between 1985 and 2004 
Source:  1985 and 2004 Sierra Leone Census Data24
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Town 1985 Population 2004 Population Growth 
Entire Country 3,515,812 4,976,871 41% 
Freetown 469,776 772,873 64% 
Bo 59,768 149,957 150% 
Kenema 52,473 128,402 144% 
Koidu-Sefadu 82,474 87,789 6% 
Makeni 40,038 82,840 106% 
Blama 5,559 4,000   (est.) -30% 
Segbwema 8,257 5,000   (est.) -40% 
Daru 3,830 8,000   (est.) 210% 
Kailahun 9,054 15,000 (est.) 120% 
Koindu 8,238 10,000 (est.) 21% 
Buedu 3,479 8,000   (est.) 129% 
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The widespread growth of towns can be attributed to a number of factors.  It 
seems likely that many people, especially young men, came to prefer the opportunities 
and freedoms associated with town life over the strictly controlled, hierarchical, and 
gerontocratic life of the village.25  At the same time, in the years spent living in the town 
during the war, many people become economically linked to them and came to prefer the 
higher standards of living and better access to resources, especially education for their 
children.  Regardless of the reason, it was clear that one of the biggest effects of the war 
was to speed up the process of urbanization. 
The divergent growth of smaller towns may be related to their pre-war size and 
layout.  Before the war, Koindu, Segbwema, Blama, and Pendembu26 were all important 
towns of the first, commercial type described earlier.  These towns saw some of the 
heaviest fighting and damage to infrastructure, followed by sharp post-war population 
declines.  Daru, Buedu, and Kailahun had less well developed infrastructure before the 
war, were less damaged, and saw large gains in population after the war.  While several 
unique conditions of these towns also played a role, it seems as though damage done to 
the infrastructure in towns of the first type was so great that it may have been easier to 
start from scratch in the less developed towns that weathered the war better. 
The post-war condition of towns was fundamentally different from that of 
villages, in that most villages were completely destroyed and had to be rebuilt from 
scratch; whereas, even the most devastated towns still had a good deal of infrastructure 
remaining.  At the same time, rebuilding a village could be done relatively quickly and 
cheaply, while repairing or reconstructing a building in a town was expensive and time 
consuming, often to the point that many projects will take several years to a decade to 
complete, assuming they ever begin.  This meant that many towns were, three years after 
the war, either still in their worst wartime state, or that only makeshift repairs had been 
made to damaged sections.  In the larger towns, the damage was often selective, so that 
you might see only one home destroyed along an entire street, or in town centers it  
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    Figure 21:  The Remains of an Important House in Kenema 
    Figure 22:  New Shops in Front of Old Foundations in Segbwema
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would only be the government buildings that were destroyed. (See Figure 21.)  The 
damage was much more widespread in the smaller towns, often the result of repeated 
battles.  In a few towns, every store along the entire street front was reduced to rubble or 
a foundation, while those shopkeepers who returned had erected simple wooden stands 
over what remained to sell their wares. (See Figure 22.)
Pakistani UNAMSIL peacekeepers built circular welcoming monuments at the 
entrances to many towns in the Eastern Province.   In a select few, they also helped 
rebuild the mosque. Several abandoned UNAMSIL bases, guard posts, and checkpoints 
were left where they were, perhaps in an effort on the part of the peacekeepers to 
memorialize their service. (See Figure 23.)  Other notable memorials included signs and 
graves in Kenema, graves of Army officers in Segbwema, and the remains of murals of 
famous soldiers in Daru.  The consensus among most people I talked to was that their 
first priority was the reconstruction of homes, schools, churches, mosques and 
government buildings, a task that was not yet complete. They also wished to simply 
forget about the war and did not see anything worth memorializing.
In several towns, NGOs like Oxfam, UNHCR, MSF, GTZ, CRS, ICRC and IRC 
were well established.27  Some rented property near the town center to use as an office, 
while others built their own compounds near the outskirts of town.  They made their 
presence well known with the signs and banners they posted near the town center, which 
were some of the most noticeable features in smaller towns. (See Figure 24.)  One IRC 
representative stated they were trying to transition from post-war aid to standard 
development by focusing on issues like women’s rights, domestic abuse, and education.
Land near the edge of town, which had once been the location of IDP camps, was 
largely abandoned.  The remains of foundations were partially evident where rows of 
shelters once stood.  Some of these sites still had a few homes of those who never left 
and claimed to be the caretakers of the land. (See Figure 25.)  The site of Nyandiama 
camp in Kenema was being encroached upon by the expanding city, where dozens
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    Figure 23:  Remains of a Pakistani UNAMSIL Base in Buedu 
    Figure 24:  Sign Posted by an NGO in Kailahun 
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    Figure 25:  The Last Remaining Dwelling of Lebanese Camp, Near Kenema 
Figure 26:  Suburban Growth on the Abandoned Site of Nyandiama Camp, Near 
Kenema 
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of middle to upper class well-built homes were under construction. (See Figure 26.) 
Rebel Forest Bases 
 Rebel bases were the most unique and ephemeral of morphological units.  These 
bases, or camps as they are known in the vernacular, were the critical element of RUF 
operations during Phase II and allowed the RUF to escalate a small border rebellion into 
a full fledged civil war in little over a year.  Their purpose was to provide a secure and 
remote base for training and from which villages and towns could be raided and the main 
highways ambushed. 
History
In the first two years of the war, the RUF strategy was heavily based on the 
capture of towns and villages and the assimilation of their populations into the rebel 
movement.  During this time the major towns and the occasional village were the base 
from which the rebels operated.  The first recorded forest base was created near 
Kailahun in 1992 to serve as a youth training camp.  This was intended to give the RUF 
the capacity to train its own fighters without the interference of the NPFL.  After 
learning about the camp, the local NPFL destroyed it.28  Not long thereafter, the NPRC 
counteroffensive was launched and further rifts with the NPFL led to their return to 
Liberia.  The RUF was severely weakened and near defeat when a new plan emerged, 
which became Phase II. 
 Forest bases were the central component of this new plan.  From these bases, the 
RUF was able to raid with impunity across large swaths of the country, and in these 
bases it could train any civilians unlucky enough to be captured.  This strategy was used 
to great effect between 1993 and 1997, when dozens of camps were founded across the 
country.  The EO campaign to destroy several of the larger bases, coupled with the 
growing power of the CDF, led to the destruction of many bases between 1996 and 
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1997.  Following the AFRC coup in 1997, the RUF came out of the bush to join forces 
with the SLA, returning to the use of towns and villages as bases.  While some splinter 
factions continued to operate out of forest camps, control of a sizeable number of towns 
during Phase III allowed the RUF to largely abandon these bases later in the war. 
Geography 
 The most important aspect of the location of these bases was that they were 
constantly moving, both within and between regions.  When the encampment moved 
within a region, it did so because it had been discovered or destroyed by the enemy and 
the general location remained the same, within a few miles.  A base would move to a 
different region when the conditions of the war no longer required its existence or the 
inhabitants were needed elsewhere.  In either case, these bases were no more than 
temporary encampments lasting anywhere from several months to a few years. An NGO 
report documenting the war describes this aspect of the forest base quite well: 
The RUF conscripted thousands of Sierra Leoneans of all 
ages and both sexes to be trained as fighters at large 
training bases.  These were opened from time to time 
depending on the state of the RUF advance, on the number 
of new conscripts and recruits and on the logistic support 
available.  While one senior RUF officer was responsible 
for the opening of bases and the provision of training, this 
did not stop other, smaller training bases from being 
opened under localized commands.29
The aim of the RUF was to have at least one large base near each major town, 
highway, or economic region.  The base was always sited in a heavily forested area with 
steep terrain—typically in one of the rain forest preserves scattered across the country—
and was five to ten miles from the nearest road or settlement. Because of their shifting 
nature, it is difficult to determine where and when these bases existed.  There were often 
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three to four major bases in each province, with dozens of smaller camps, observation 
posts, and way-stations spread across the country.30
Morphology
Every former combatant I interviewed gave me the same basic story for the 
layout of forest bases.  Each base was comprised of one central camp and between two 
to five satellite camps.  The central camp was the largest component, anywhere from two 
to three times the size of a satellite camp and generally occupied the same area as a 
medium village, with up to one-hundred structures laid out in a grid pattern.  This central 
camp was where most of the rebel soldiers and loyal non-combatants lived, and where 
all looted goods and weapons were stored.  This camp was often located atop or beside a 
hill; some even required climbing ropes for access.  The satellite camps were much 
smaller, no more than a few hundred square meters, with perhaps a dozen makeshift 
buildings.  Here the training of new conscripts occurred and here most of the slave 
laborers lived.  All of this activity was completely concealed by rain forest canopy. 
Most of the structures, known as baffas,31 were simple open buildings with no 
walls and a grass or leaf roof.  There might be a few wattle and daub structures in the 
satellite camp, and slightly more in the main camp.  Cutting down trees was strictly 
prohibited as it would reveal the base’s location, meaning that there was little 
construction material to work with.  Much of the stolen zinc wound up in the central 
camp; some former combatants even described entire buildings made out of zinc.  Other 
structures might include a church, a healer’s hut, and some type of obstacle course.  
Distributed throughout the camp were shallow holes used to store weapons and 
ammunition, which were only accessible when defending the base defense or when 
leaving to go on a raid. 
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Attack and Defense
The defenses were laid out in a series of concentric checkpoints along all of the 
avenues of approach, generally bush paths.  At the first checkpoint, there would be two 
men, about four to six miles from the nearest road or village.  One to two miles towards 
the base would be a section of ten to twelve men, who were separated from the satellite 
base by another one to two miles.  The satellite bases might each have anywhere from 
thirty to one-hundred fighters at any time.  When the base was attacked, the rebels would 
slowly fall back to the nearest satellite base, while the entire base network was alerted 
and joined them.  The satellite base would then be the site of the skirmish with the rebels 
using the buildings for cover.  These skirmishes regularly ended with the destruction of 
the satellite base.  The central bases were well defended, due to their location atop or 
beside steep hills or slopes and their well-sited machine gun nests.   
Attempts were made by the SLA to destroy some of these camps, but these 
efforts would often result in only the destruction of a satellite base, while the attackers 
would leave under the false impression that the entire camp had been destroyed.  In 
addition to laying in ambush along paths leading to the camps, the Kamajors also 
launched raids against them from time to time, though not with the intention of 
destroying them.  The main offensive, which saw the destruction of several of the most 
important camps, was led by EO in 1996, and by 1997 most of the major rebel bases 
were destroyed or abandoned. 
The influence of forest camps, which were a product of the war, was very 
different from that of towns and villages, which existed before the war.  This difference 
means that they began as an intentional change in the landscape, but very quickly 
became a dominant feature able to influence the course of the war.  Their location was 
influenced by the pre-existing settlement geography—they were built within striking 
distance of the major towns and highways—but they allowed the forces operating from 
them to effect severe changes in that pre-existing geography.  At the most basic level, 
Phase II could not have worked without them, for the entire premise of their new  
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    Figure 27:  Remains of an Obstacle Course in a Satellite Base Near Camp Zogoda 
    Figure 28:  The Few Remaining Artifacts in the Central Base of Camp Zogoda
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strategy was to raid, not occupy, towns and villages: and these raids had to be launched 
from somewhere. 
Post-war Remains 
Although I only visited the remains of Camp Zogoda, I believe the fate of every 
rebel forest base was quite similar, as a decade of laying abandoned in the rain forest 
will erase most traces of previous inhabitance. (See Figures 27 and 28.)  In the spaces of 
the camp, the undergrowth was thicker, out of place in the mostly open forest.  A few 
artifacts were present, including a rusted ammo box, some extremely deteriorated zinc 
(perhaps taken from one of the villages I visited), and what seemed to be the faceplate 
for an air-conditioner.  In some places, the ground was raised, possibly the remains of a 
foundation, very similar to what many villagers claimed were the foundations of 
destroyed homes.  It is not surprising that there were very few material remains, as 
anything of value would have been looted by the attackers, or later on by nearby 
villagers coming through to recover stolen items, especially zinc roofing.  These scant 
remains serve as a reminder of how temporary these camps were and how quickly they 
vanished from the landscape. 
Transportation Networks 
 This element of the landscape was important for the obvious reason that it was 
the glue holding all of the other features together.  There were very few changes in these 
networks as a result of the war, though their influence on its character is worth 
discussion. 
Morphology 
At the most basic level, there are two largely separate transportation networks: 
roads and bush paths.  Roads vary in quality from the tiny fraction that are freshly paved, 
mostly connecting major towns, to a much larger fraction that are dilapidated and  
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       Figure 29:   A Typical Bush Path
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covered in potholes, to the vast majority, that are simple dirt tracks, impassable during 
much of the rainy season.  Though there are a great many miles of roads in Sierra Leone, 
there are still large areas and many villages that they cannot reach.  For these regions, 
one must use bush paths, the total length of which easily exceed by ten times the length 
of all roads combined. (See Figure 29.)  Some of these link scattered villages in the bush.  
Many connect villages to their numerous farms, secret society bushes, or skisiahun, 
and others are a sort of bush highway across regions without roads.  These bush paths or 
trails are often not much wider than a person and are flanked by thick, at times 
impenetrable vegetation on either side.
Throughout the war, regular military forces like the SLA, ECOMOG, and 
UNAMSIL consistently used only the roads.  They were dependent on roads because 
they were all motorized formations and they lacked the training or confidence to fight 
the rebels in the bush.  In contrast, the RUF and especially the CDF, as well as elements 
of the AFRC and ULIMO, showed a marked preference for using bush paths and by-pass 
routes for movement.  Since it was only at the very beginning and very end of the war 
that the rebels had any type of motor transport, the use of bush paths was certainly an 
option, with the added benefit of masking their movements from their more 
conventionally minded enemies.  The CDF, comprised of hunters and villagers 
intimately familiar with the bush, also performed well in this environment, often proving 
more capable bush fighters than the rebels, which led to their use as scouts and 
auxiliaries by both ECOMOG and the SLA. 
Influence
 In terms of pure mobility, transportation networks influenced the war by favoring 
foot-mobile military forces over motorized forces.  Motorized forces, such as the SLA, 
ECOMOG, and UNAMSIL, were severely constrained due to the few paved roads 
traversable year round, the considerable number of dirt roads largely impassable during 
the rainy season, and the inaccessibility by road of many villages and later rebel bases.  
The obvious benefit was that when they were available, roads allowed rapid movement 
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of large forces.  The foot-mobile forces of the RUF and the CDF, were unhampered by 
these constraints, as they relied on bush paths.  These paths were far more numerous, 
could be traversed year round, and allowed access to large areas untouched by roads.  
However, travel by bush path was slow and required large forces to break into smaller 
elements whose convergence on a target required high levels of coordination. 
 Another aspect of transportation networks was the opportunity they provided for 
ambush, a feature exploited to great effect by the RUF and to a lesser degree by the 
CDF.  Throughout the war, but especially during Phase II, the rebels were notorious for 
laying ambush to the highways linking the major cities.  They attacked SLA formations, 
relief convoys, and ordinary civilian traffic with impunity.  In this way, they utilized 
their own transportation method to deny the enemy his, by moving to and from 
ambushes along the highways by bush path.  This tactic allowed the RUF to effectively 
isolate several towns during Phase II, creating islands of government control in a sea of 
rebel dominated territory.  Though only small sections of the country were under rebel 
control, they gave an appearance of ubiquity by denying access to the major highways 
and selectively raiding near and far through bush paths. 
Although the rebels frequently used bush paths, they by no means controlled 
them.  This fact was exploited by the Kamajors, who proved adept at ambushing the 
rebels along bush paths.  The Kamajor battle song is about setting the dambi, or trap, for 
the rebels.  This tactic was aided by their knowledge of the terrain, which was superior 
to that of the rebels, as most were assigned to protect their native villages or 
chiefdoms.32  It may seem surprising that the CDF did not engage in the same sort of 
guerilla war against the AFRC, since they were road bound for the year or so before the 
ECOMOG interventions.  This fact helps illustrate the main differences between the two 
groups, as the CDF was a decentralized, defensive response to the centralized, offensive 
goals of the RUF.  The CDF were only involved in offensive operations as auxiliaries, 
mainly as scouts and skirmishers assisting regular military formations, like the SLA, EO, 
or ECOMOG. 
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 Muana, ‘The Kamajoi militia.’
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Post War
 There was not a tremendous difference between the pre and post-war 
transportation networks.  The NPRC did initiate several road cleaning projects in the 
major towns, and segments of the highway between Freetown, Bo, and Kenema, were 
repaved between 1992 and 1994.  For the most part, the existing roads, many first laid 
down in the 1950’s and 1960’s, continued to deteriorate, unsurprisingly when one 
considers the maintenance required to keep many of the dirt roads to remote villages in a 
traversable condition. It is likely that a majority of the bush paths became overgrown 
from disuse when most of the villagers fled to the towns, but this overgrowth would 
have been quickly remedied after resettlement.  One important effect of the post-war 
road state was to funnel aid into only those places most reachable by road.  Remote 
villages along poorly maintained roads, and especially villages only access by bush path, 




TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE CULTURAL LANDSCAPE: 
AN HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF PORTIONS OF  
KAILAHUN AND KENEMA DISTRICTS 
 In this chapter I will describe the landscape history of three different places in the 
Eastern Province during and after the war.  This narrative will weave together the 
interactions of the four morphological units outlined in the previous chapter.  The first 
section includes the towns of Kenema and Blama, thirteen villages in between, and 
Camp Zogoda.  In the next section I will discuss the towns of Segbwema and Daru, and 
six villages in between.  The last section is a collection of eight villages and three towns 
spread across the Liberian and Guinean border in Kailahun and Kenema districts.  
Although, significant gaps exist in the testimonies I received, I have attempted to fill 
these in with the help of a very detailed NGO report on the history of the conflict.1
Between Kenema and Blama 
 This region is comprised of Kenema Town, Blama Town, and most of the 
villages in between these two towns that lie along the highway. (See Figure 30.)  Seven 
villages sit next to this stretch of highway, with at least twice as many more accessible 
by bush path.  During the war this region was important because it lay along the main 
transportation corridor between Freetown and the interior, specifically between Bo Town 
and Kenema Town.  Not far to the south of the highway was Camp Zogoda, the rebel 
headquarters between 1994 and 1996. 
 Although parts of Kenema District were attacked earlier in the war, it was not 
until late 1993 that this region became involved in the fighting.  In December of 1993,  
                                                           
1
 Gaps were filled in using Smith, ‘Conflict mapping,’  Section I p. 299-326 and Section II & III p. 261-
291. 
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       Figure 30:  Map of Subregion I (Sierra Leone (map), 1968) 
several hundred revels emerged from their hideout in the Gola West Forest Preserve and 
destroyed a swath of villages on their trek to the Kambui Hills Forest Preserve, South of 
Kenema.  Here, Foday Sankoh personally selected the site of Camp Zogoda, which was  
founded between January and February of 1994.2  This base was the first of the new 
bush camps that Phase II would depend on.  The activities Camp Zogoda supported and 
attempts to destroy it would dominate the fighting in this region until late 1996.   
 The Zogoda was laid out like most rebel forest bases, and it is described in the 
TRC Report as “an encampment of makeshift buildings and storage huts nestled in the 
forest atop a ridge in the Kambui Hills.”3  Although this is a good general description, I 
                                                           
2
 ‘Truth and reconciliation commission report,’ p. 7-90. 
3 Ibid, p. 7-90. 
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received a more detailed account of the base from a former Kamajor.  There were 
defensive checkpoints at two mile intervals along the trails leading towards the base.  
Training was conducted in satellite bases surrounded by a high bush wall with barbed 
wire.  There was an obstacle course, a barracks, and several large pits for storing 
weapons.  The trainees carried heavy gear and wooden rifles.  On a large hill, a few 
miles away, was the main camp.  The hill was so steep that you had to use ropes draped 
down from above to reach the top.  It was the size of a large village, with many well 
ordered huts, some with zinc roofs.  In the center was a large house where Foday Sankoh 
lived; it had a generator and a lot of modern office equipment. 
 Immediately after construction of this camp, the rebels began attacking 
surrounding villages.  The thirteen villages I visited were first attacked within a two 
week period in late March or early April.  These attacks were timed to coincide with the 
rice harvest, which many villagers were subsequently forced to carry to Camp Zogoda or 
its satellite bases.  Only two villages in this region, Taninahun and Fabinah, were spared 
due to their location a few miles north of the highway.  They were eventually attacked 
on January 11, 1995.  These initial attacks were mostly major raids where only important 
structures were destroyed and a few people killed while everything was looted.  One of 
the larger villages, Weima Tokmombu, with around one-thousand people, was 
completely destroyed, except for the mosque where the rebels spent the night.  All of the 
zinc roofing was removed and carried back to Camp Zogoda.  The two remaining 
villages, attacked in January of 1995, were completely destroyed, aside from one or two 
buildings left to store loot and spend the night. 
 Most villagers immediately fled into the bush during the attacks, while an 
unlucky few were captured by the rebels and taken to Camp Zogoda.  Those who fled to 
Kenema or Blama, often arriving at Bandama Checkpoint (along the highway on the 
western edge of Kenema).  Once in Kenema they stayed with family or friends, or they 
squatted on vacant property or at schools, which eventually became Internally Displaced 
Person’s (IDP) camps.  Some villagers chose to stay in the bush for up to a year after the 
first attack before finally moving to Kenema, surviving on bush fruits or small farms 
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hidden in the bush.  In Weima Handubu, the villagers spread out around the bush within 
a few miles of the village and built small settlements of five to six huts each.  One of 
these, named Kangama (refuse to go) was built on the site of a small palm oil processing 
station, essentially several large pits where the seeds were crushed.  A few other villages 
had similar stories, but on a much smaller scale.  Those who stayed behind were 
constantly harassed by the rebels and had to rebuild their bush shelters every few 
months.  At the same time these first raids were launched, ambushes along the Bo-
Kenema highway began and by June the entire stretch of highway was considered 
impassable.  The town of Blama, which had a small garrison of soldiers, was attacked 
six times.  The rebels eventually managed to occupy a portion of the town separated by a 
small bridge.  Much of the town center was destroyed as a result of the fighting, while 
the homes of prominent civilians were intentionally destroyed by the rebels. (See Figures 
31 and 32.) 
 The massive influx of displaced villagers from across the district led to the 
establishment of several IDP camps in Kenema and one in Blama.  There were at least 
four camps in Kenema:  Lebanese Camp, built on the site of the Lebanese school on the 
western edge of the city, with around fifteen-thousand residents; Gofor Camp, built near 
the bridge across the Moa to the south, with around eight-thousand residents; Nyandiama 
Camp, in the south-east, with around sixteen-thousand residents; and RTI Camp, near 
the site of the Rural Technical Institute.  One additional camp was also created in Blama, 
along the highway to the east of the town, which had as many as fifteen-thousand 
residents.  Most of these camps did not come into existence until later in the war, 
between 1996 and 1998, and they seem to have been most populous during the 1998 to 
2000 period.  Though it is unclear when, it does appear that these camps were sometimes 
attacked outright, while at other times the food stores were raided by the RUF, SLA, and 
later the AFRC. 
Kenema was first attacked in December 1994.  The battle lasted eight days and 
began as a raid on the homes of prominent people.  As many as eight other attacks like 
this were conducted between 1994 and 1996, with the rebels often coordinating the  
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     Figure 31:  Remains of a Destroyed House in Blama 
     Figure 32:  Remains of a Looted Office in Blama 
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attacks of several small groups from different directions simultaneously.  Most of these 
battles lasted a few days and ended with the destruction of the homes of important 
people or government offices.  Several of the outlying settlements very close to Kenema 
were also raided on a regular basis, driving more people into the town center. 
In the village of Baiama, soldiers escorted villagers back in July of 1995, 
constructed defenses out of the remaining zinc, and stayed for three months until moving 
to nearby Serabu.  Within a week of their departure, the rebels attacked and razed the 
village.  This village may have been resettled early because it lies along several bush 
paths close to Camp Zogoda, which may have been routes for groups of rebels moving 
to ambush the highway.  Many villages also reported being attacked from the general 
direction of Njala, a few miles south of Baiama.  After moving to Serabu, one of the 
larger villages in this region, the soldiers constructed similar defenses and beat back 
numerous rebel attacks over the next two years.  However, most villagers from this 
region resided in Kenema until general resettlement began after the 1996 elections.  
When they returned, they found their villages completely overgrown and all lootable 
objects were gone, especially zinc roofs.  Several roofless structures were still standing 
in various stages of disrepair.  Those buildings that were left untouched, especially 
important structures, were often covered in graffiti.  In three villages, the rebels had 
poisoned the wells by putting gunpowder in them. 
 While in Kenema, especially in the IDP camps, many young men were recruited 
into the Kamajors, a militia which began operating against the rebels and defending 
villages in this region.  Recruiting began around June of 1996, after which many villages 
were reclaimed and resettled.  A force of around 200 Kamajors was stationed in Blama 
in October 1996.  Their work, scouting and raiding, led up to the November attack on 
Camp Zogoda. 
 Raids on Camp Zogoda by the Kamajors and sometimes the SLA were not 
uncommon.  During 1995 and 1996, several Kamajors in nearby villages claimed to have 
participated in multiple attacks on the Zogoda.  Groups of around a dozen would patrol, 
sometimes on a daily bases, in the direction of the Zogoda.  The final attack came in 
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November 1996 and included four SLA companies, a few hundred Kamajors, some 
Executive Outcomes (EO) personnel on the ground, and two EO piloted helicopter 
gunships.  Several of the satellite bases were attacked by ground forces, while blocking 
elements were placed at all of the escape routes.  After a three day intermittent artillery 
bombardment on the central base, rebels began surrendering in mass, allowing the 
ground forces to converge on and destroy the central base.4
 The destruction of their main forest base pushed the RUF to the negotiating table 
and a peace treaty was soon drawn up.  Nevertheless, intermittent fighting continued and 
serious rifts began to emerge between the SLA and Kamajors over the questionable 
activities of the former, which included harsh treatment of civilians, widespread looting, 
and apparent collusion with the RUF.  In Kenema, this conflict led to skirmishes 
between soldiers and Kamajors at checkpoints, the burning down of several Kamajor 
houses, and the execution of several of their fighters and imitators.  Eventually this 
fighting developed into the AFRC coup of May 1997, after which the soldiers invited the 
rebels to come out of the bush and share power. 
 Their combined occupation of Kenema led to widespread looting and a large 
flight of civilians, but fortunately there was little outright destruction.  One of their first 
acts was to attack the Kamajors and destroy their homes and support networks.  After 
heavy fighting, the highly outnumbered Kamajors were forced to go into hiding or flee 
into the bush.  In August of 1997, a large group of Kamajors residing in Blama were 
driven out and many of their houses and the houses of those who had been assisting 
them were burned down.  A training and interrogation base was set up the south of 
Kenema on the site of the waterworks.  Here, many suspected Kamajors were detained, 
tortured, and eventually executed.  The remains of this camp were covered with graffiti 
detailing the exploits of its former occupants. 
 The second round of attacks on villages began soon after the coup and continued 
on weekly basis between 1997 and 1998.  Most of these were raids of various intensity, 
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 The description of this assault come from interviews with former Kamajors and SLA personnel, personal
communications with P.K. Muana, and from: Jim Hooper, Bloodsong: First-Hand Accounts of a Modern 
Private Army in Action (HarperCollins, London, 2003), p. 248. 
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but at most only a few houses were destroyed in any village.  The rebels and soldiers 
who attacked were more concerned with looting, especially food supplies, than causing 
destruction.  In Serabu, the rebels and soldiers established a training base for young men, 
and looted material from all of the surrounding villages was taken there.  Some villagers 
fled to Kenema again, but since it was also under AFRC control until 1998, it was not 
always a safe place.  It is unclear what percentage of the population remained in the 
countryside during this time, but it seems to have been less than half.  At the same time, 
many Kamajors went into hiding in the bush, only coming out to visit their villages at 
night for food.  Over time, they grew in strength and began leading small scale 
operations against AFRC forces. 
 In February of 1998, Nigerian peacekeepers (ECOMOG) captured Freetown and 
began the push up country, arriving in Kenema by the end of the month.  AFRC forces 
fled without a fight and the city was quickly taken over by ECOMOG, who were 
assisted by a large number of Kamajors.  The Kamajors set about establishing 
checkpoints and pass systems to control civilian movement, while publicly torturing, 
executing, and burning down the houses of anyone who collaborated with the AFRC.  
By March, large number of displaced people began to return to the villages around 
Kenema as they were secured by Kamajors.  The number of displaced people residing in 
Kenema and in the camps continued to fluctuate between 1998 and 2000 as intermittent 
rebel raids continued.  However, by 2000, this region was largely secure and by end of 
2001 all of the IDP camps were closed down and resettlement was complete. 
 After the war, these villages were in the condition described in the previous 
chapter.  They were smaller in population and area and had fewer, less well-built homes.  
A few villages had received some post-war aid.  Weima Tokmombu had a dozen 
concrete homes with zinc roofs built by a Canadian NGO, most likely chosen because of 
its proximity to Blama.  Three other villages had new wells dug by the African Muslims 
Association, since the previous ones had been poisoned by the rebels. 
 Blama was much the worse for wear and less populated than before the war.  
Most of the buildings in the town center were either abandoned or destroyed and many  
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     Figure 33:  Remains of a Destroyed House in Kenema 
Figure 34:  A Makeshift Structure Built atop a Destroyed House Foundations in 
Kenema 
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of the homes of prominent residents still lay in ruins, especially along the road heading 
south to Sendumei.  Kenema also had ruins, but they were much more scattered.  Along 
the main road through town, a few large government buildings were destroyed, but new 
ones were being erected in their place.  The remains of several destroyed homes of  
prominent residents were dispersed throughout the town. (See Figure 33.) No effort had 
been put forward to rebuild these homes because many of the residents were killed 
during the war and their children had either left the country or were too poor to rebuild.  
In other places, makeshift buildings, often of wood or wattle and daub construction, had 
been built atop the foundations of completely destroyed buildings. (See Figure 34.)  
Despite these ruins, the town as a whole had grown significantly since before the war.  
This growth is very clear in satellite imagery and is also evident by the large number of 
construction projects on the edge of town. 
 Kenema, unlike other cities, had a large number of monuments and memorials.  
Pakistani peacekeepers built a large clock-tower along the entrance road, which reads 
“Long Live Pak-Sierra Friendship.”  They also converted their former base into a 
children’s park, though I never saw any children playing in it. (See Figure 35.)  In a 
small village, in the hills on the outskirts of town, there were plans for a monument to 
remember the victims of a rebel attack in which over thirty villagers were killed.  The 
Catholic priest behind the project showed me the site and told me about his idea to build 
a monument atop the mass grave with the names of the dead and a description of what 
had happened.  At the edge of this village was the grave of a holy man who supposedly 
foresaw the war in a prophecy, though he died long before it began.  After the war a new 
headstone was emplaced noting his prediction. (See Figure 36.)  A very small and 
unobtrusive sign, funded by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, was placed along 
an intersection where many civilians were once massacred. (See Figure 37.)  Along a 
fork in the main commercial strip, set in a small grass plot, was the grave of Dr. Alpha 
Lavalie, who was famous for his plan to use the Poro Society to recruit civilian 
irregulars to fight the rebels. 
 . 
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     Figure 35:  A UNAMSIL Base Converted into a Children’s Park 
Figure 36:  The Grave of Holy Man Who Predicted the Civil War, Built After the 
War 
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            Figure 37:  A Sign in Kenema Posted by the TRC on the Site of a Massacre 
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Between Segbwema and Daru 
 Segbwema and Daru, only seven miles apart, were the locus of heavy fighting 
through much of the war.  Both towns lie along the old colonial railway, the main 
transportation corridor heading to Freetown.  Before the war, Segbwema was an 
important trading and services town, with a hospital, several good schools, a bank, and a 
large market with many shops.  The town of Daru sits on the eastern shore of the Moa 
River, while the Moa Barracks, nearly as large as the town, lies across a small bridge on 
the western shore.  Many of the villages in this region were heavily affected by the 
fighting over these two towns. 
    Figure 38:  Map of Subregion II (Sierra Leone (map), 1968) 
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I visited the towns of Segbwema and Daru, as well as six out of the twenty or so 
villages in between them. (See Figure 38.)  While this number is only a small portion of 
the villages in this region, there were still noticeable patterns and connections between 
events happening in the towns and the villages during the war.  After the initial assault 
on Daru early in the war, this region saw only brief raiding in late 1992, since it was well 
defended at that time.  During Phase II there was also only minor and intermittent 
raiding, while both towns became host to large IDP populations.  Most of the heavy 
fighting occurred after the AFRC coup, as the previously well defended villages were 
now open game.  Both towns subsequently changed hands several times and took high 
levels of damage between 1998 and 1999. 
 The capture of Daru was a major objective for the northern front of the initial 
RUF offensive in 1991, which would have neutralized the largest SLA base in the 
district and given the rebels control of one of the few bridges over the Moa River.  The 
main force of NPFL/RUF fighters reached the town of Daru in late April and quickly 
occupied the town and burned down the houses of important people before soldiers from 
the Moa Barracks forced them to retreat.  The townspeople went to live in the barracks, 
while a large number of soldiers moved into the town and beat back several more rebel 
attacks over the next several months.  Eventually these soldiers were reinforced by 
troops from Guinea who brought much heavier firepower to the defense.  Intermittent 
attacks continued until October or November when an infamous NPFL commander led 
the largest attack yet.  The town was captured and the soldiers retreated back to the 
barracks, but the rebels were unable to take the bridge.  Eventually their commander was 
killed in the fighting and they retreated.  Much of Daru was destroyed as a result of the 
artillery and rockets used by the Guineans.  Daru was not attacked again until December 
1996, very late in Phase II. 
 Segbwema was first attacked on December 25, 1992, almost a year after the 
cessation of attacks on Daru, probably by a small force from the north where the rebels 
had bypassed the Moa River.  During this attack, a small group of NPFL fighters held a 
prominent doctor hostage in his home before beheading him and burning down his 
 74 
house.  A small group of soldiers, police, and ULIMO fighters managed to push them 
out after several hours of fighting.  Soon after, soldiers arrived from Daru to serve as a 
garrison and set up defensive emplacements along the town entrances.  After their 
arrival, there were no more attacks until Phase II, during which a few minor raids were 
repelled with little damage to the town. 
 In the first round of attacks on villages, Baiama and Tongoma, on the main road 
between the two towns, were attacked in December 1992.  This attack occurred roughly 
at the same time as the first raid into Segbwema, but the village attacks probably 
occurred first.  Both villages were occupied by the rebels and were used as bases of 
operation in the region.  Most of the villagers fled to the IDP camps at Segbwema.  
Within a year, soldiers from Daru had removed the rebels from both villages and stayed 
there for some time until the villagers returned in 1996, at which time Tongoma and 
Baiama were ruined.  It is likely that several other villages along this road were attacked 
at or near the same time.  A third village, Dambu, the second village out from Segbwema 
along another route between the two towns, was raided in early 1993, a few months after 
the previous attacks.  Soldiers were defending Dambu, but they retreated when the rebels 
came.  Baiama or Tongoma may have served as a staging point for this raid and others.   
Dambu was unoccupied until 1995, when it was resettled with the assistance of some 
soldiers who set up defensive positions.  It appears that those villages closest to Daru 
and Segbwema were well defended and held by the SLA for most of the war, as they 
believed any successful assault on either town would have to first capture these villages. 
 In response to these attacks and the general insecurity in the region, people began 
to flock to both towns in 1991.  In Segbwema, by 1993, there were at least four-thousand 
squatters encamped throughout the town.  This led to the creation of an IDP camp on the 
road to Majihun village in May of 1993, which came to host between six-thousand and 
thirteen-thousand IDPs.5  One or two years later, another camp was created at the Moa 
Barracks in Daru with around eight-thousand residents.  During and after the elections in 
1996, people began to leave the camps in order to resettle their villages. 
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 Henry, Embodied Violence, p. 47. 
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 The second round of fighting followed the AFRC coup of May 1997, in which 
the rebels and the soldiers joined forces.  Now that they controlled both towns, there was 
widespread looting as well as the destruction of the homes of Kamajors and their 
supporters.  The villages of Mofindo, Yendema, and Baiama were all attacked.  
Yendema and Mofindo both lie near, but off of the main road between the two towns, 
perhaps the greatest factor which preserved them to such a late point in the war.  At 
Yendema everything of value was looted and many houses were destroyed, while many 
villagers were captured and taken to a Peiyama Camp to the north.  The small village of 
Mofindo was also raided, though most villagers managed to escape into the bush.  There 
they built and rebuilt small clusters of dwellings over the next few years, while being 
constantly harassed by rebels and soldiers.  Baiama was attacked for a second time, but 
from a different direction—the rebel base at Giema to the east.  Much of the village was 
looted and destroyed, while those captured were taken to Giema. 
 Though there were some prior raids by Kamajors alone, Segbwema and Daru 
were not recaptured until ECOMOG forces assisted by Kamajors came through in March 
of 1998.  Segbwema was captured first, after heavy fighting, which saw the use of heavy 
weaponry and damage to the town.  This force then moved on to Daru, but was 
ambushed a few miles from the town.  This ambush developed into a running battle 
involving several villages along the road (none that I visited), the Moa Barracks, and the 
town of Daru itself, all of which were severely damaged by the fighting.  ECOMOG and 
the Kamajors were able to capture Daru and hold on to it throughout the rest of the war, 
despite numerous AFRC attacks. 
 Segbwema was attacked twice by AFRC forces over the next several months.  
Although both attacks were defeated, several homes and buildings were destroyed as a 
result of the fighting.  In December of 1998, a very large attack occurred, which 
succeeded in capturing the town.  By some accounts, ECOMOG fled when they learned 
of the attack and the remaining Kamajors were not properly equipped to handle the huge 
assault.  Most of the damage to the town caused during the war happened in this attack,  
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     Figure 39:  ICRC Building in Central Segbwema in 1997 (Photograph courtesy of     
     Doug Henry) 
      Figure 40:  Remains of the ICRC Building in Central Segbwema in 2005 
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when Majihun Road Camp was also destroyed. (See Figure 39 and 40)  Many residents 
fled to Kenema where they stayed for the remainder of the war.  This attack was part of a 
larger national strategy to isolate ECOMOG forces at the Moa Barracks while other 
AFRC forces launched the devastating attack on Freetown a few weeks later.  AFRC and 
later solely RUF forces were able to hold Segbwema for the rest of the war, despite 
almost daily attacks from Kamajors in Daru. 
 At least three villages (Mendekelema, Dambu, and Tongoma) were attacked this 
time.  Mendekelema, very close to Segbwema, was completely destroyed following the 
attack on the city, forcing many residents to flee to Daru.  Dambu was attacked at the 
same time and was also completely destroyed.  The last attack occurred in Tongoma, but 
it was unclear if this attack was related to the assault on Segbwema.  The village was 
looted and much of it was also burned down, though the villagers were allowed to flee to 
Daru barracks.  Most of the villages between the two towns were occupied by a 
succession of soldiers, rebels, Kamajors, and ECOMOG over the next two years of 
fighting.  When villagers returned in 2000 and 2001, many said small groups of 
Kamajors were living there. 
 Whereas before the war Segbwema was the more important and larger town, its 
role had now been usurped by Daru, which was now larger and much more populous.  
Though there had been much destruction in Daru as a result of the war, it was not 
entirely evident at the time of my fieldwork, since most of the town had been rebuilt.  
After the 1998 attack on Segbwema, many displaced people and donor agencies 
relocated there.  Many of the villages around Daru were not well defended when it was 
first attacked and they were easily destroyed.  These villagers had to live in Daru 
throughout the war and many of them chose to stay there after it was over.  Also, many 
of the IDP camp dwellers remained after the war because they became tied to the 
community through marriage or land tenure arrangements.  These factors helped Daru 
maintain and increase its population after the war, which helped raise the resources and 
incentives to rebuild the town. 
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      Figure 41:  Paintings of Famous Soldiers in Daru 
     Figure 42:  Monument to an Indian Peacekeeper in the Moa Barrack 
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There were two monuments worth noting in Daru.  In the town of Daru were 
several paintings of famous soldiers, made early in the war, some of whom were the 
NPRC coup plotters. (See Figure 41.)  These paintings may have been more than pure 
propaganda as there seems to have been more trust and dignity associated with the 
military in the first one or two years of the war.  When I asked a local policeman about 
the paintings, he apologized for their presence and stated there was a plan to remove 
them.  They might also have served as a recruiting device as a small flyer for the current 
RSLMF was posted near one of these paintings.  In the Moa Barracks there was a large 
obelisk honoring an Indian UNAMSIL peacekeeper who died in an assault on Pendembu 
in 2001. (See Figure 42.)  I expressed my surprise to the officer escorting me that the 
first real monument to the war would honor a foreigner.  He replied that there was 
nothing in the actions of his countrymen worth honoring and that they had enduring 
respect for any foreigner who would give his life for Sierra Leone 
 Segbwema faired much worse during and after the war than Daru.  Though a 
significant amount of the town was destroyed through the fighting, larger potions were 
also looted.  Some of this looting was done by AFRC forces who sold the materials (zinc 
roofs, doors, and windows) to traders in Guinea or Liberia, while even more were simply 
stripped off by early returnees in 2002 before widespread resettlement began.  A high 
level of destruction was centered on the edge of town along the road to Daru, where 
constant raids were carried out by Kamajors between 1998 and 2000.  The remains of 
one Nigerian armored vehicle lay here, while another sat near the new police station.  
(See Figure 43.) 
 The worst destruction was around the main market street and the old town center, 
which before the war contained several two-storey concrete buildings, but was now 
filled with rubble and foundations. (See Figure 44.)  Along the market strip, some 
makeshift wooden shops had been erected, but there was little activity,  as most of the 
traders had either been killed or fled during the war.  The main secondary school had 
been repaired (it had been deroofed during the war) by the GTZ, while the bank and 
police station were rebuilt by the government.  One large area of well-built homes was  
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     Figure 43:  Remains of an ECOMOG Tank Near the Police Station in Segbwema 
    Figure 44:  Ruins Near Central Segbwema 
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          Figure 45:  The Grave of Captain Prince Ben-Hirsch in Segbwema 
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now only ruins and foundations covered with small wattle and daub dwellings.  Another 
area of similar homes was occupied by the RUF during their stay and was still in good 
condition, aside from being covered in graffiti.  This section of town was closest to the 
road to Bunumbu, which led to the rebel base at Peiyama. There were a few graves of 
notable soldiers who died during the early years of the war, when people still had faith in 
the Army.  One of these belonged to Captain Prince Ben-Hirsch who was famous for his 
skillful use of irregular combatants to fight the RUF. (See Figure 45.) 
 A combination of factors reversed the roles of these towns after the war.  
Segbwema’s heyday was in the 1950’s and 1960’s and ever since the closing of several 
training farms and dismantlement of the railway in the 1970’s, it had been slowly 
declining.  The large amount of infrastructure kept the town alive and made it the 
economic center of Kailahun District until the outbreak of the war, when many of these 
fixed assets were destroyed.  Daru absorbed much more post-war aid partially because it 
was perceived as more secure by donor agencies, since Segbwema was occupied by the 
RUF for the last four years of the war.  It was also rumored that the Paramount Chief in 
Segbwema would not allow any NGO’s to rent property for an office, instead forcing 
them to buy land.  Not a single NGO accepted this policy and Segbwema never received 
any post-war aid. 
 There is little new to say about the post-war state of villages in this region as they 
followed the patterns outlined in the previous chapter. (See Figures 46 and 47.)  A few 
villages received assistance in water and sanitation projects (the digging of wells and 
latrines), but none were given any dwelling reconstruction aid.  In fact, zinc roofs were 
fairly rare and the few I saw were looted from the Moa Barracks after the war, and 
understandably so, since they were originally stolen from the villagers. 
 83 
     Figure 46:  Mofindo After the War (Njaluahun Chiefdom) 
     Figure 47:  A House Under Construction in Yendema (Njaluahun Chiefdom) 
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Borderlands of Kailahun and Kenema Districts 
The last region, comprising eight villages and three towns, does not fall in to  
nearly as compact of a study region as the previous two. (See Figure 48.)  Instead, this 
region represents a smattering of sites across Eastern Kailahun and Kenema districts.  
Most of these villages were visited because of some important feature.  Several are very 
close to the Liberian border and were some of the first villages attacked during the war.  
Though these accounts reveal few local patterns, they are interesting for their 
idiosyncrasies and because of some of the larger processes they reflect.  Instead of 
describing the entire region as a chronological progression, as in the previous two 
sections, I will give the full story of each village and town separately. 
   Figure 48:   Map of Subregion III (Sierra Leone (map), 1968) 
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Belabu and Faima are two large villages south of Kenema, near the Gola Forest 
Reserve and Liberian border, which were attacked very early in the war.  Faima was first 
attacked on April 12, 1991.  Most residents thought it was only an NPFL food-finding 
raid from Liberia.  There were no political messages and no Sierra Leoneans could be 
discerned among the fighters.  They came into the village shooting at anyone who ran 
away and asking for “Momoh’s soldiers.”  The villagers were gathered and told to 
separate between Liberians and Sierra Leoneans, after which the gunmen began killing 
the Sierra Leoneans.  In the chaos that followed, over sixty people were killed and the 
entire village was looted without destroying any buildings.  Nine days later, Belabu, 
fifteen miles up the road to Kenema, was attacked by a similar force.  This time, no 
villagers were killed.  However, they were assembled and spoken to by a Commander 
Qadaffi, while their homes were looted.  The rebels returned every few weeks for 
supplies and recruits until a group of soldiers came and began firing on the village 
indiscriminately.  Though there were no rebels there at the time, several villagers were 
killed.  Afterwards, the soldiers scolded the villagers for assisting the rebels.  From then 
on, it became very difficult to tell the soldiers and rebels apart. 
 Both villages were attacked again a few days before Christmas in 1993.  Faima 
was defended by at least one platoon of soldiers, who were defeated by a large force 
coming from the direction of the border.  The entire village was destroyed and many 
more villagers killed.  Foday Sankoh was supposedly spotted with the force on their way 
to found the Zogoda.  Only a few days later, another force (soldiers, but more likely 
rebels dressed as soldiers) razed Belabu and converted what was left into a temporary 
base.  Not long after this attack, villages around Kenema (see the previous section) 
began experiencing raids from the South.  It is very likely that these attacks were made 
by the spearhead force that went on to found Camp Zogoda.  Both villages were 
abandoned until the election in 1996, when Kamajors returned with villagers from 
Kenema and the IDP camps.  After 1997, this area became hotly contested between the 
AFRC and the Kamajors.  Belabu managed to hold off several attacks and survive, but 
Faima was razed a second time in January of 2000 by a large AFRC force. 
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 Neama and Mendekelema, about ten miles apart, both lie along a main road south 
of Daru, not far from the Gola Forest Preserve and only about twenty miles north of 
Belabu and Faima.  Both of these villages are very large, with around three-thousand 
occupants each, and both have five to eight smaller satellite villages around them.  
Mendekelema was attacked in mid-May of 1991.  A few people were killed and the 
houses of many important people were destroyed.  After this attack, the remaining 
villagers were assembled and spoken to about the RUF’s plan.  Most of the fighters who 
claimed to be in the RUF were Liberian or Burkinabe.  Many young boys were 
conscripted as porters, but they eventually became soldiers.  The next day, soldiers came 
and fired upon the village, but soon left, allowing the rebels to return and execute around 
sixty prominent people, who were later buried in mass.  Much of the village was 
destroyed during this attack and many villagers fled into the bush.  This pattern of 
soldiers coming for a few days followed by rebels continued until 1995 when the village 
was almost completely destroyed and the remains were occupied by the RUF. 
In Neama events worked out very differently.  During the first attack, within a 
few days of the attack on Mendekelema, very few people were killed and no houses 
were destroyed, though the villagers were assembled and spoken to.  Several young men 
were conscripted, after which the rebels left.  Many of the villagers fled into the bush 
until a few months later when a force of ULIMO militia and soldiers came to defend the 
village.  They dug trenches, erected checkpoints, trained some of the villagers, and 
patrolled the surrounding area aggressively.  Neama began attracting displaced people 
from many nearby villages who sought this protection.  RUF attacks were occurring 
several times a week though, mostly as small raids to kill or conscript a few villagers.  
The village grew to over five-thousand inhabitants during this time and nearly became a 
recognized IDP camp, as food shipments were delivered from a major NGO.  It was 
decided that the people could be better cared for in Kenema so the village was 
abandoned in 1995.  Only a few soldiers and young men stayed behind, but the RUF 
soon forced them out. 
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After the elections in 1996, the RUF abandoned both villages.  Neama was 
resettled with the help of several local Kamajors and Mendekelema was resettled with no 
help at first, but later a large contingent of ECOMOG troops and Kamajors were 
stationed there.  Both villages remained relatively peaceful until after the AFRC coup.  
In August of 1998, Neama was attacked by a very large AFRC force that routed the 
Kamajors, razed the entire village, and killed over one-hundred people.  Within one 
week, the AFRC force moved on to Mendekilema where there was a major battle with 
over one-hundred troops on each side.  The ECOMOG forces defended with bomber 
aircraft, helicopter gunships, and armored cars, but were overwhelmed after three attacks 
in one day.  The village was razed and over forty people were killed.  What remained of 
the villages was occupied by the RUF/AFRC until resettlement began in 2000 and 2001. 
Bomaru, the first village to be attacked in the war, had a population close to five-
thousand when the war began.  The events surrounding the attack on Bomaru are 
confusing.  I received several different versions of the story.  It is clear that the village 
was attacked two to three times over a two week period, and that both soldiers and rebels 
were involved in each fight.  The soldiers were defeated each time and after their final 
defeat the villagers were gathered and told about the RUF’s goal to take Freetown.  Over 
one-hundred villagers were killed during the skirmishes and a few houses were 
destroyed.  The RUF eventually conscripted many young people from this village.  
Bomaru was recaptured during the NPRC counteroffensive in May of 1993, but it was 
largely deserted as many villagers fled, fearing retribution from the government, while 
most of the other villagers were forced to retreat back to Liberia with the RUF.  The 
soldiers remained in the village and soon it had returned to its pre-war size as people 
from surrounding villages sought protection there.  The RUF began to occupy the 
smaller abandoned villages surrounding Bomaru from which they launched constant 
raids, often abducting people tending their farms or outside the village at night.  The 
soldiers beat back several raids into the village, but they eventually abandoned the area  
sometime in 1995.  Now attacks from the rebel base at Giema to the South increased, 
though they never tried to capture the village.  After the AFRC coup, this region was 
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devoid of Kamajors and ECOMOG forces never ventured this far out.  In May of 1998, 
just a few months before similar attacks on Mendekilema and Neama, Bomaru was 
attacked and destroyed by a large AFRC force.  Some people who had fled to Liberia 
earlier returned and settled here with RUF/AFRC forces who remained until the war 
ended in 2002. 
I also visited Giema, a small village atop a hill less than a mile from Liberia, but 
was unable to learn much.  The village was first attacked early in the war in March of 
1991.  No one was killed and no houses were destroyed, but nearly all the young men 
were conscripted into the RUF.  A few years later, on the site of the village or 
somewhere in the nearby bush, a major rebel base was created, which became the 
national headquarters for some time after the Zogoda was destroyed in 1996.  The 
village was full of ruins and had been razed at least once, though I was unable to 
determine if this action occurred before it became a major rebel base or as part of one of 
the attacks to destroy the base. 
The last two villages, Vaama and Kunduwundu, are both small villages on the 
road leading out of Kailahun Town and Buedu Town. (See Figures 49 and 50.)  Vaama 
was attacked in early April of 1991, but no one was killed and no buildings were 
destroyed.  The roads were blocked in all directions, so many villagers stayed and most 
of the young men were conscripted into the RUF.  Rebels would pass the night there 
while moving along the highway to Kailahun Town.  The Army came in 1993, but the 
rebels and most villagers had already fled to Pendembu.  They returned one year later to 
find the entire village destroyed and looted, and rebuilt the village as it stands today.  
Since this village was deep inside rebel territory, the village never saw any more 
fighting.  Kunduwundu is outside Buedu, a few miles from Liberia and was also attacked 
in early April of 1991.  This attack was more of a desecration raid as important people 
were tied up and beaten in public while their houses were burned down.  Most of the 
villagers were forced to carry loot back to Liberia and never received any type of  
 89 
     Figure 49:  NGO-built Houses in Kunduwundu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom) 
    Figure 50:  Houses in Vaama (Luawa Chiefdom) 
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revolutionary sermon.  Many of the villagers stayed in Liberia or fled to Guinea, leaving 
the RUF to occupy the village alone for most of the war.  When the villagers returned in 
2001, two houses remained standing and everything of value had been looted. 
After the war, these villages saw slightly smaller population declines than the rest 
of the study region.  This difference may be because many of them are relatively far 
from the nearest town, whereas in the previous two sub-regions there was a town within 
five miles of every village.  Perhaps the closer a village is to a town the less likely its 
inhabitants are to return.  The only village to receive any post-war aid was Kunduwundu, 
where World Vision built ten concrete homes with zinc roofs.  When traveling to Koindu 
from Kailahun by motorcycle, I did notice a very large number of roadside villages with 
dozens of concrete homes, clearly built by NGOs.  In Bomaru, there were plans for a 
monument to honor those killed in the first attack. (See Figure 51.)  There was actually a 
village meeting with the contractor when I arrived, where I learned that there was much 
more interest in having seed drying floors built than a monument.  In Neama and 
Mendekilema, both badly hit during the war, entire rows of foundations were visible 
stretching on for a few hundred feet.   
Unfortunately, I was able to gather little useful information regarding the war-
time state of the towns of Kailahun, Buedu, and Koindu.  Many people I spoke with fled 
to Guinea within the first year of rebel occupation and could only describe the state of 
the town upon their return after the war.  All three towns were first captured between late 
March and early April of 1991.  In Kailahun and Koindu, no one was killed and no 
homes were destroyed.  The townspeople were gathered and told about the revolution, 
after which many young men were conscripted, while other civilians were forced to 
carry looted goods back to Liberia.  In Buedu around a dozen important people were 
killed and their homes destroyed when the town was first captured. 
Between April and June of 1993, all of these towns were recaptured by the SLA, 
although not for more than a few months.  The RUF fled without a fight and convinced 
many civilians to join them or else face the unforgiving SLA.  Those civilians who 
remained were harassed and beaten by the SLA.  Many were sent to Daru where a 
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  Figure 51:  Plans for a Monument in Bomaru (Upper Bambara Chiefdom)
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 clumsy system was established to determine who was a civilian and who was a rebel.  
Any suspected rebels or collaborators were executed.  The SLA also went about 
systematically looting anything that remained, to be sold later at the markets in Daru.6  
Those few who were able to visit the towns at this time described them as being very 
bushy and abounding with structures missing roofs, doors, and windows, though there 
was little outright destruction. 
With the beginning of Phase II, these towns were recaptured by the RUF with heavy 
fighting, which caused a lot of damage to buildings and infrastructure.  Sometime in late 
1996, Kailahun and Buedu were recaptured by the SLA, at which time they were almost 
completely deserted.  Within a few months, the AFRC coup occurred and the rebels 
were in control of these towns once again.  During May of 1998 ECOMOG forces 
attacked and temporarily captured Buedu and Kailahun, but were soon pushed out by 
RUF/AFRC forces.  This fighting also caused severe damage to these towns.  All three 
towns were occupied by the rebels until disarmament in 2001, at which time they were 
sparsely populated, overgrown, and full of destroyed or looted buildings. 
After the war, Koindu was by far the most devastated town, while much of the 
damage to Kailahun and Buedu had been repaired or concealed. (See Figures 52 and 53.)  
In their general appearance, Koindu closely resembled Segbwema, while Buedu and 
Kailahun were much more like Daru.  As was the case in the previous section, the high 
levels of pre-war infrastructure may have prohibited reconstruction efforts in Koindu, 
while the lack of infrastructure in Buedu and Kailahun eased efforts to rebuild.  Despite 
the poor state of Koindu, it was still bustling with activity, since its role as an important 
trading town between Liberia and Guinea had not changed.  Pakistani peacekeepers also 
built welcoming monuments at the entrance to all three towns, which were decorated 
with development messages from NGOs. (See Figures 54 and 55.) 
                                                           
6 Henry, Embodied Violence, p. 35. 
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    Figure 52:  Ruins of the Market Center in Koindu 
     Figure 53:  Remains of a Destroyed House in Koindu 
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    Figure 54:  Central Monument and NGO Signs in Buedu 




The cultural landscape of Sierra Leone was profoundly transformed by its eleven 
year civil war and this thesis has attempted to make sense of that transformation.  Some 
things are clear—three unique landscapes were associated with the war (prewar, 
wartime, and postwar) and the transformation between them had definite spatial and 
temporal patterns.  A variety of deeper processes underlay these changes in the 
landscape.  The character of the landscape went far to influence the course of the war 
and these influences can be clearly discerned, both at the scale of the individual 
morphological units and in their totality.  The key to understanding the influence of these 
features lies in the ability to see the landscape through the eyes of the different factions 
so that we may comprehend how they utilized the landscape to pursue their war aims. 
Changes in the Landscape 
Obtaining reliable information on the composition of the prewar landscape 
proved difficult, though some general characteristics have emerged.  There was little 
development in infrastructure after the establishment of a one-party state under Siaka 
Stevens in the early 1970’s.  During his reign, economic conditions deteriorated to the 
point that Sierra Leone was one of the poorest countries in the world by the time the war 
began.  The general picture is one of countless small villages dispersed across the 
countryside consisting mostly of houses made of mud-brick and zinc, though thatch and 
wattle and daub houses were not uncommon.  A handful of very large towns, laying 
along the track of the old railway, served as the main commercial centers, while 
numerous smaller towns were spread across the country.  Villages and towns were the 
dominant features in the landscape, connected by a dense network of bush paths and an 
aging system of roads. 
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During the war, the character of the landscape changed drastically.  Villages 
were systematically raided, abandoned, looted, and destroyed by both the RUF and the 
SLA.  Villagers fled to the towns, which doubled or tripled in population.  In response, 
IDP camps were created in several large towns, holding up to twenty-thousand people.  
These overcrowded towns and IDP camps proved difficult to defend, making them a 
common target for rebel raids.  Refugee camps were also created near the border in 
Guinea.  The rebels created a network of constantly shifting and secluded forest bases 
from where they launched their incessant raids.  Transportation networks changed as 
well.  Roads were not used for fear of ambush, forcing many civilians to make long 
journeys across the numerous footpaths criss-crossing the countryside.  The rebels also 
utilized these footpaths to mask their movements, routinely massing troops from 
different bases during offensives.  Periodically, a ceasefire would lead to a premature 
hope that the war was over.  On multiple occasions, this hope resulted in widespread 
resettlement and rebuilding of abandoned villages only to have them destroyed again 
when the ceasefire ended. 
As the war ended in 2002 and resettlement was complete, the landscape did not 
return to its prewar state.  Most villages became shadows of their former selves—
reduced in both population and area.  The dominant house type changed from zinc roofs 
with mud-brick walls to thatch roofs with waddle and daub walls.  Abandoned sites 
littered the countryside and included tiny villages never resettled, the remnants of IDP 
camps, and former rebel bases.  Towns changed as well.  Most had grown substantially 
during the war in both population and area.  In Kenema, a process of suburbanization 
was occurring as expensive houses were being built on the site of former IDP camps at 
the outskirts of town.  NGOs were an extremely pervasive element in the post-war 
landscape.  Their presence was signified by their ubiquitous white land cruisers, the 
numerous signs posted in villages and towns where they had worked, and their offices, 
often on the most expensive real estate in town.  Less noticeable was an effort to 
remember the war in monuments and memorials.  There had been little progress here, 
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probably because insufficient time has passed for people to have the desire or the ability 
to do so. 
Changes in the landscape during and after the war are the superficial reflections 
of deeper social, economic, and demographic processes. The first process, the massive 
and constant migration of civilians during the war, was caused by the general feeling of 
insecurity perpetuated by the RUF.  These migrations began as an abandonment of the 
countryside in favor of the towns, but went on to include movement between regions, 
out of the country, and temporary returns to the countryside.  This underlying process is 
reflected in the extremely temporary character of the war-time landscape.  Villages were 
destroyed and rebuilt numerous times, with their consistency changing each time.  Rebel 
bases were constantly being destroyed or abandoned and then rebuilt in a new region.  
Most IDP camps lasted only a few years and even during their brief existence there were 
continuous cycles of growth and contraction as the population fluctuated.  These 
migrations, which were to a large degree instigated by the RUF and the SLA, 
concentrated the population in towns, IDP camps, and rebel bases.  In doing so, both 
factions were able to increase their control over the civilian population, perhaps the most 
important objective in a civil conflict.  The results of this process were ephemeral and 
creative, producing landscapes that existed for only short periods during the war and 
then disappeared entirely upon its conclusion.   
 The second process, reflected in both the war-time and post-war landscape, was 
the new economics of looting.  A majority of the changes that occurred in the landscape 
were not the result of outright destruction, but of looting.  After the roof, doors, and 
windows of a home or building were removed, it was only a matter of time in the 
tropical monsoon climate before the structure began to weather away and was reclaimed 
by the bush.  These and other looted materials fueled the rebel war machine and lined the 
pockets of soldiers through most the war.  This second process was more permanent and 
destructive, yielding a new postwar landscape, but one that was largely a subtraction 
from its prewar character. 
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 After the war, the reconstruction of this subtracted landscape was pursued 
through two means: small scale initiatives using local labor and materials and the 
attraction of vaunted post-war aid from the government or an NGO.  The dispersement 
of post-war aid was heavily slanted to urban areas and those villages easily accessible by 
road.  A majority of villages received little or no aid and were forced to revert to the 
construction of primitive homes available within their limited means.  This factor, 
combined with the fact that a majority of the rural population became accustomed to 
town life during the war may help us to understand why so many villagers chose to 
remain in the towns in the post-war era. 
In the colonial era, massive infrastructural investments were made in towns like 
Segbwema, Blama, and Pendembu to exploit the economic linkages of the railroad 
through the mass exportation of agricultural and forest products.  After the dismantling 
of the railroad and subsequent changes in the global prices of commodities during the 
1970’s and 1980’s, the original purpose of these towns slowly faded away.  The main 
reason why these towns were able to maintain their dominance was because of the 
services they offered, such as markets, banks, health care, and education did not exist 
elsewhere and no new investments were flowing into the country. 
By destroying much of the fixed capital in towns, the war freed these economic 
linkages to realign in a manner more consistent with the post-colonial economic 
geography.  Towns better placed along road networks, like Daru and Kailahun, and those 
with connections to markets in neighboring countries, like Koindu and Buedu, were well 
situated to exploit the opportunities presented after the war.1  This realignment was not 
purely economic.  For the same reasons that towns like Segbwema were important 
before the war, they were desirable targets during the war and suffered greatly from 
fighting to control them.  Less desirable towns were less devastated and thus better 
placed to grow in the post-war era. 
These changes reflect David Harvey’s notion of creative destruction, or that 
capitalism generates two opposing processes, the embedding of dead labor (capital) into 
                                                           
1
 Although Koindu was not booming after the war it was recovering faster than other towns with heavy 
damage to infrastructure like Segbwema, Blama, and Pendembu. 
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the landscape (also known as the spatial fix) and the eventual need for that landscape to 
be destroyed to “make way for new geographical configurations of production, 
exchange, and consumption.”  These tensions eventually develop to crisis proportions, 
which somehow lead to the destruction of the obsolete landscape, so that a new 
landscape may be created (creative destruction).2  In Sierra Leone the colonial landscape 
was clearly failing to meet the economic needs of the country, especially just prior to the 
war.3  This failure precipitated a crisis of the state and the economy that resulted in the 
civil war, the agent which destroyed the remnant colonial landscape, allowing economic 
linkages to realign themselves after the war.   
Influence of the Landscape 
Each element of the landscape contributed a unique influence to the character of 
the war.  Villages presented an excellent target, ensuring that much of the day to day, 
tactical fighting would revolve around their capture, defense, or raiding.  They set the 
general course of the war as one made up of numerous tiny skirmishes pitting rebels and 
soldiers against ordinary civilians.  The influence of towns was much more specific, as 
many campaigns revolved around their capture or isolation.  Rebel forest bases also had 
a very specific influence—they allowed Phase II to work so effectively by providing a 
secure space for training conscripts and launching raids.  Transportation networks 
influenced the war by consistently favoring foot-mobile forces using bush paths over 
motorized forces using roads.  These elements combined to create the conditions for a 
war that would favor the insurgency, cause extreme hardships for the civilian population, 
and be a protracted conflict in which the insurgency could attempt to exhaust the will of 
the government. 
                                                           
2
 David Harvey, ‘The geography of capitalist accumulation’ in John Agnew, David N. Livingstone & 
Alisdair Rogers (ed.), Human Geography: An Essential Anthology (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1996), 
p. 620-621.  Though he does not use the term “creative destruction” in this piece, this is clearly argument 
he puts forward is the same. 
3
 David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (James Currey, Oxford, 2005), p. 8-35. 
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 The discussion above highlights the general possibilities presented by the 
landscape, but it was up to each faction to decide how they could best utilize these 
possibilities to serve their war aims.  Before we can understand how they did so, we 
must recognize that each faction perceived the landscape as having a set of risks and 
opportunities associated with it.  This perception was largely a product of their intentions 
and capabilities.  Intentions can be understood as military objectives, which are derived 
from political objectives.  Capabilities are the material and moral resources at their 
disposal and serve to enable certain types of action while constraining others.  It follows 
that each faction would then perceive a different set of possibilities present in the 
landscape, since they were all looking at it with different intentions and capabilities.  
These perceptions were also dynamic—shifting as experiences, capabilities, and the 
balance of forces changed during the war. 
The claim that these perceptions were shared between members of each faction is 
supported by interviews conducted during fieldwork and simply examining the events of 
the war.  It could also be argued that the shared understanding of the risks and 
opportunities that the landscape presented them with was rooted in common practices.  
For example, two teenage rebels conscripted from different ethnic groups moving along 
a bush path in preparation for an ambush will probably see the landscape in a similar 
manner out of necessity.   
The intentions of the RUF were to delegitemize the government and the army, 
control the civilian population, establish an economic base, and to defeat enemy forces 
in the field.  Their major capabilities were a general lack of heavy weapons and vehicles 
and no moral inhibitions associated with the use of force against civilians.  The first 
capability constrained their capacity to engage their enemies on an equal footing in a 
direct confrontation, while enabling their mobility and easing their logistical needs.  The 
second capability enabled control of the civilian population through fear and terror, 
although the resentment this control fostered destroyed any chance of popular support 
and was a major contributing factor to the growth of irregular militias. 
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 The intentions of the SLA were to retain control over the key towns, control the 
civilian population, and to contain, rather than defeat the RUF, so that they could 
continue to profit from the war and maintain the power it allowed them.  Their material 
capabilities were the direct opposite of the RUF’s as they were equipped with heavy 
weapons and ample vehicles for movement.  The firepower at their disposal gave them 
an advantage in direct fighting, but their motorized quality limited their movement to 
roads and tied them to the towns for logistical purposes.  Their moral capacities were 
similar to those of the RUF though less calculated in presentation.  The sobel (soldier by 
day, rebel by night) phenomenon is a reflection of this capacity.  The strange 
combination of their unwillingness to defend villages, but the frequency with which they 
looted them after RUF attacks, eventually destroyed their legitimacy in the eyes of the 
civilian population and was another factor that contributed to the growth of irregular 
militias. 
 The intentions of the CDF were primarily to defend and resettle villages, reclaim 
control over the countryside from the rebels, and to act as auxiliaries to more regular 
forces in offensive operations.  Their major capability was their knowledge of the 
terrain, experience in the bush, and support from the local population.  These factors 
worked in their favor when they were within their own chiefdoms, while their use in 
other areas put them on a more equal footing with the rebels as bush fighters and led to 
looting, extortion, and atrocities.  Another capability was their armament, even more 
limited than the RUF, often only single barrel shotguns and machetes.  This constrained 
their combat power to ambushes, raids, and bush fighting, while preventing them from 
mounting offensive operations on their own.  The benefit was that they required very 
little logistical support and could blend in to the civilian population much easier. 
At the beginning of the war the RUF and SLA had similar views of the 
landscape.  Towns were the objects that the RUF sought to conquer and the SLA sought 
to hold.  While both sides used roads, the RUF also exploited bush paths in their 
movement through the countryside.  The key difference was in their perception of 
villages.  The SLA saw villages as a risk because they were difficult to defend.  
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However, once captured, villages became a target, the destruction of which deprived the 
rebels of a support base.  The RUF saw villages in the reverse manner; they were an 
opportunity, which could be easily captured and later turned into support bases and 
training camps.  Although the balance of forces initially favored the RUF, these scales 
slowly shifted over the next year until the NPRC led counteroffensive began in 1993.  
The RUF was forced to abandon most of its territorial possessions and flee into the bush.  
Out of sheer necessity, they were forced to modify their plans for the conduct of the war, 
and with it their view of the landscape. 
As Phase II began, the RUF adopted a fairly different view of the landscape, 
which was more appropriate to their weaker position and limited means.  The most 
important change was that they would no longer operate out of towns and villages, but 
would create secluded bases in the forest.  For movement, they would rely solely on 
bush paths, while laying ambush to the main road networks to deny the SLA its source 
of mobility.  Using these bush paths to mask their movements, they would strike far and 
wide at villages and towns across the country.  Towns were no longer an object to be 
captured, since the RUF was too weak, instead they were to be raided and isolated (by 
ambushing surrounding roads).  While there were material rewards for these raids, they 
served the greater purpose of delegitemizing the military government by revealing its 
inability to protect its own citizens.  Villages were still seen as targets to be attacked, but 
occupation was replaced by raiding. 
The SLA’s view of the landscape changed little during Phase II.  Roads were still 
their sole source of movement, even though they were prone to ambush.  They still saw 
the towns as the locus of their power and sought to keep it that way.  Most villages were 
still left undefended, though looting following rebel raids increased in frequency.  This 
rigid perception of the landscape played into the hands of the RUF.  The emergence of 
the Kamajors in 1995 presented a new actor with a very different perception of the 
landscape.  Their familiarity with the countryside allowed them to make villages and 
bush paths into a risk for the RUF.  Their raids and assaults on forest camps, in 
conjunction with EO and elements of the SLA,  denied the rebels a secure base of 
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operations.  The Kamajors denied the RUF’s use of the landscape in the same manner as 
the RUF had denied the SLA its use of the landscape, by turning their potential 
opportunities into risks. 
After the AFRC coup, the balance of forces fundamentally changed as did the 
conditions of the war.  The Kamajors were now severely outnumbered by the combined 
forces of the AFRC and the SLA, who were in control of the towns.  The now insurgent 
Kamajors continued to perceive the landscape as they had during Phase II, defending 
villages and patrolling bush paths.  Throughout this period, the RUF/AFRC alliance 
perceived the landscape in a hybrid manner, combining elements of operations from both 
Phases I and II.  Towns were still viewed as the primary targets, with all out assaults 
more common than raiding, since the forces were more equally balanced.  Villages were 
seen as a risk because they had the potential to support insurgent Kamajors, yet they 
were also still seen as an opportunity for resources and at times as support and training 
bases.  Roads and bush paths were used interchangeably, depending upon the needs of 
the situation, and the RUF continued to excel at laying ambushes along the major 
highways. 
This framework for understanding the influence of the cultural landscape is not 
unique to Sierra Leone.  It can be applied to other civil and revolutionary wars, and 
could also be used to understand how conventional forces comprehend the nature of the 
physical landscape.  Although I have only a general knowledge of the conditions in Iraq 
I will offer a few comments based in this type of analysis.   
In Iraq, the population distribution is much more weighted to urban areas and the 
remaining rural areas consist of nucleated settlements strung out along the major rivers.  
Here the population is much more concentrated and urban than in Sierra Leone.  The 
various insurgent groups utilize this landscape in two main ways.  First they have turned 
the road-bound motorized nature of the occupation forces into a major weakness by 
using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to set ambushes and quickly melt back into 
the surrounding population.  Their superior knowledge of the urban terrain gives them an 
advantage when towns become battlefields, such as in the large battles in Fallujah or 
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Mosul.  The second aspect of their operations is to tempt the occupation forces into stand 
up fights in large towns, where heavy firepower inevitably comes into play.  This 
firepower usually results in a great deal of damage to the town and unintentional civilian 
casualties, which serves to harden opinions against the occupation forces and garner 
grudging support for the insurgency. 
Recommendations 
I would like to end this work with two recommendations pertaining to geography 
and the military.  Research that asks questions similar to this work is without a doubt 
rare.  With a few notable exceptions, it is very difficult to find publications that examine 
the impacts of war on the cultural landscape or vice versa.  As I have said before, most 
cultural geographers shy from military topics while military geographers tend to ignore 
the human dimension. 
The first recommendation is that cultural and military geographers pursue topics 
in the vein of this work.  This recommendation is not a programmatic statement, rather 
an attempt to nudge those few researchers willing and able to do difficult work under the 
worst of field conditions in the right direction.  One cannot argue with the fact that we 
live in an age of small wars, often called low-intensity conflicts by the military, which 
are to a large extent mediated by the cultural landscape.  To date, most research 
conducted in this manner is carried out by anthropologists.  While I applaud and 
appreciate their contribution, there is still plenty of room for geographers here.   
Anyone seeking to pursue such a study could benefit from my mistakes.  Were I 
to conduct another study in this manner, I would choose a conflict still in progress and 
preferably one that had just begun and I would make repeated visits to the study region 
over the course of the conflict and its aftermath.  If the budget permits, a one or two 
week reconnaissance trip to visit the country and the intended study region would help 
immensely in planning fieldwork and formulating a research question.  Apply for 
funding as early as possible, because paying out of pocket is expensive and unnecessary.  
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When studying the relevant literature, learn which scholars, irrespective of their 
academic discipline, are pursuing similar questions and get in contact with them.  Their 
advice, knowledge, and local contacts could prove invaluable and they are often eager to 
help a fellow scholar. 
When constructing a research framework, the most important questions are the 
scale of the study region and how one will manage breadth vs. depth.  In my fieldwork, I 
probably strayed too far in the direction of breadth, resulting in a fairly shallow depth.  It 
may have proved more useful to learn a lot about a few places, than a little (and often 
very similar stories) about a lot of places.  When dealing with questions of death and 
destruction, people will be more open if there is a sense of trust with the researcher and 
that trust takes time to develop.  One way to reduce this tension is to familiarize oneself 
with the culture and especially to speak the native language, a skill I regret not acquiring. 
Another pitfall is the tendency, at least in my case, to privilege the knowledge and 
opinions of elites.  In my experience, ordinary people are often more truthful, more 
accessible, and more knowledgeable. 
Researching the study region and planning for fieldwork are important, but one 
should maintain a high degree of flexibility and mobility when in the country, especially 
if a conflict is raging.  Very often, the constraints of transportation, lodging, and safety 
are the major limiting factors controlling where you can travel and what kinds of 
research you can pursue.  These problems can be mitigated by packing light and not 
sticking religiously to a fieldwork plan made months in advance.  The goal should be to 
stay flexible and let the research take you where it may. 
My second recommendation is that the military begin to evaluate the role of the 
cultural landscape in low intensity conflicts, a necessity apparent through the stalemated 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  While the military excels at understanding the influence 
of terrain and physical geography on its own operations, it has generally failed to 
examine the role of the cultural landscape or to comprehend how the enemy perceives 
either the physical or the cultural landscape.  Soldiers and officers are uniquely 
positioned to document these relationships through their experiences in these conflicts.   
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The underlying premise behind this recommendation is that a better understanding of the 
impacts of military operations on the landscape and the way landscapes are perceived 
and utilized by insurgent groups will lead to more successful counter-insurgent strategies 
than those which are currently favored. 
A degree of overlap exists between these two recommendations.  Though I find it 
unlikely, the military could contract geographers to do studies in current war zones.  At 
the same time, military officers who already have an interest in academic geography 
could contribute their own field experiences to both military and academic professional 
journals.  In either case there is ample opportunity for future studies and the 
development of a general body of knowledge on this topic. 
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